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The Case for Categorical
Nonenforcement
LEIGH OSOFSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent presidential administrations have engaged in high-profile
nonenforcement of the law, including, in the current administration,
nonenforcement of immigration laws, federal marijuana laws, and
parts of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.' In response
to such nonenforcement, commentators have begun asking what
would happen if a future President decided not to enforce the tax
laws. Could a President decide not to enforce the estate tax, the in-
come tax with respect to millionaires, or the income tax for anyone
who has paid a specified percentage of income in taxes? 2
Constitutional scholars have suggested that the President cannot
declare categorical, or complete, prospective nonenforcement of some
aspect of the law.3 Even commentators supportive of recent nonen-
forcement initiatives have suggested as much, drawing a distinction
between setting low enforcement priorities and categorical nonen-
forcement, and arguing that the former is permissible, while the latter,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Many thanks to
Michael Froomkin, Pat Gudridge, Fran Hill, Leandra Lederman, Caroline Mala Corbin,
Zachary Osofsky, Bernie Oxman, Zachary Price, Michael Sant'Ambrogio, Dan Shaviro,
Peter Strauss, Alan Viard, Larry Zelenak, and workshop participants at NYU School of
Law, the 2014 National Tax Association Annual Conference on Taxation, the 2014 Junior
Tax Scholars Workshop.
I For more details regarding these instances, see text accompanying notes 7-11.
2 See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Obama's Immigration Plan Should Scare Liberals, Too, N.Y.
Mag. (Aug. 11, 2014, 3:06 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/08/obamas-immi
gration-plan-should-scare-liberals.html ("What if a Republican President announced that
he would stop enforcing the payment of estate taxes?"); Robert J. Delahunty & John C.
Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 784 (2013) ("Can a President
who wants tax cuts that a recalcitrant Congress will not enact decline to enforce the income
tax laws?"); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L.
Rev. 671, 688 (2014) (asking whether a President lawfully could decline to enforce the
capital gains or estate taxes). Recently, George Stephanopoulos asked President Obama
himself. Interview by George Stephanopoulos with President Obama (ABC television
broadcast, Nov. 23, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/Il/president-obama-
defends-use-of-executive-action-on-immigration/.
3 This conclusion has applied to criminal and civil law. See text accompanying notes 12-
14.
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by negative implication, is not.4 Scholars have drawn a number of
other distinctions to try to explain when nonenforcement is permissi-
ble, arguing that it may be permissible if motivated by enforcement
resource limitations but not if it is motivated by policy, and it may be
permissible if time limited.5 The implication of these distinctions is a
presumption against categorical nonenforcement. Recent tax litera-
ture examining IRS pronouncements that it will not enforce very par-
ticular aspects of the tax law has also concluded that categorical tax
law nonenforcement is troublesome from the perspective of the rule
of law.
6
What has been missing in the existing discussion, especially in the
preoccupation with flashy, yet relatively infrequent, presidential non-
enforcement of the law, is a broad-based examination of the endemic
nonenforcement that is directed by administrative agencies, and an
accompanying examination of such agency nonenforcement through
the lens of agency legitimacy. A long and extensive literature regard-
ing agency legitimacy seeks to justify agencies making significant deci-
sions about legal rights and obligations, and this literature offers
important insights about agency nonenforcement decisions. This Arti-
cle brings this literature to bear by applying theories regarding agency
legitimacy to tax law nonenforcement directed by the IRS. This ex-
amination reveals that, for a number of reasons, when the IRS is inev-
itably going to be engaging in tax law nonenforcement, categorical
nonenforcement may actually help legitimate the nonenforcement.
The IRS inevitably must make nonenforcement decisions on a daily
basis because it is tasked with administering many more tax laws
against many more taxpayers than its resources allow. As a result,
like other administrative agencies, as well as prosecutors, the IRS
must choose which tax laws to enforce or which taxpayers to enforce
against at any point in time. The IRS can make such decisions in a
variety of ways. It can decide to engage in complete, prospective non-
enforcement of certain aspects of the tax law for a period of time or
until future notice ("categorical nonenforcement"). Alternatively, the
IRS may focus enforcement resources on particular tax issues or tax-
payers ("setting priorities"). Finally, the IRS may nominally maintain
a policy of enforcing all tax laws, leaving discretion to individual reve-
nue agents to make enforcement decisions ("case-by-case" decision-
making). In a world of insufficient enforcement resources, each
method of allocating enforcement resources results in nonenforce-
4 See note 14.
5 See text accompanying notes 15-16.
6 See text accompanying notes 22-25.
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ment of some aspects of the tax law against at least some taxpayers at
any given time.
Moreover, the IRS must make at least some high-level decisions
regarding tax law nonenforcement. Different types of taxpayers,
vastly different costs/yields for different taxpayer types and tax issues,
and a sprawling administrative agency all necessitate at least some
high-level, systematic allocation of limited enforcement resources. As
a result, the IRS must rely on some of either categorical decisionmak-
ing or setting priorities to direct enforcement resources. The conse-
quence is that nonenforcement of the tax law is not spread evenly
among taxpayers, but rather is systematically concentrated on certain
taxpayers and tax issues.
This tax law nonenforcement landscape that occurs every day on
the ground at the hands of the IRS relates to a deeper question about
agency legitimacy. Scholars have wrestled for decades with the un-
comfortable role administrative agencies play in U.S. constitutional
democracy, because agencies' expansive role in the government is not
contemplated in the Constitution, and agencies make significant pol-
icy decisions about rights and obligations under the law even though
they are not elected to do so. Scholars have developed a number of
theories to help explain how agencies can legitimately play this role.
Three prominent theories are (1) the political accountability theory,
(2) the civic republican theory, and (3) the nonarbitrariness theory.
These theories posit, respectively, that agency action is legitimate if:
(1) it is subject to the control of the politically accountable branches,
(2) it is the product of a deliberative process designed to reach con-
sensus about the common good through reasoned deliberation, or (3)
it is nonarbitrary, or rational, predictable, and fair. These theories at-
tempt to apply core principles of democratic governance, which argua-
bly are rooted in fundamental U.S. constitutional values, to the
realities of the present day administrative state.
Applying these theories of agency legitimacy to the realities of tax
law nonenforcement reveals that in some circumstances categorical
nonenforcement may actually increase the legitimacy of the IRS's
nonenforcement. Categorical nonenforcement can serve as a particu-
larly salient means of communicating enforcement decisions, which
may lead to greater political accountability, increasing the legitimacy
of nonenforcement under the political accountability theory. Also
owing to its ability to make enforcement decisions particularly salient,
categorical nonenforcement may yield greater public deliberation, in-
creasing the legitimacy of nonenforcement under the civic republican
theory. Categorical nonenforcement also can serve as a practical (al-
though perhaps not legally enforceable) means for high-level officials
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
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to commit the agency to a policy of nonenforcement, which may in-
crease the legitimacy of nonenforcement under the nonarbitrariness
theory. Categorical nonenforcement, of course, may not always be
legitimacy enhancing, nor does this Article claim that it is. Rather,
this Article fundamentally claims that viewing nonenforcement
through the lens of agency legitimacy may help apply core values of
democratic governance, which are obscured or missed by the existing
analyses, to agencies' inevitable, systematic nonenforcement of the
law.
Moreover, focusing on the realities of agency nonenforcement
reveals significant limitations of the existing constitutional and rule-
of-law analyses of nonenforcement. In delineating what is acceptable
executive nonenforcement, both the existing constitutional and rule-
of-law lenses rely on formal distinctions (such as distinctions between
categorical nonenforcement and setting priorities, or between nonen-
forcement motivated by enforcement resource limitations and nonen-
forcement motivated by policy) that do not hold up well against the
realities of agency nonenforcement. In part by highlighting the limita-
tions of the existing analyses, this Article hopefully underscores how
the lens of agency legitimacy may help prompt a deeper consideration
of the values of legitimate nonenforcement.
II. ExISTING ANALYSES OF CATEGOIlICA. NONENFOIRCEMENT
Recent, high-profile presidential nonenforcement initiatives have
focused scholars' attention on executive nonenforcement. Such initia-
tives include: (1) the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program (DACA), which dictated how the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) should exercise its
prosecutorial discretion with respect to the immigration laws for cer-
tain young immigrants who meet various requirements, 7 (2) its expan-
sion of such immigration policies in the form of Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) and
an accompanying expansion of DACA,8 (3) its guidance regarding
7 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
8 Transcript: Obama's Immigration Speech, Wash. Post (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-obamas-immigration-speech/2014/11/20/14ba8042-
7117-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html; Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individ-
uals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals
Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14-1120_memodeferred_action.pdf.
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how the federal government should exercise its prosecutorial discre-
tion with regard to the enforcement of federal marijuana laws, 9 and
(4) announcements that enforcement of certain provisions of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act 10 would be delayed as a
means of providing transition relief for various requirements of the
Act."1
Focusing on such initiatives, constitutional scholars have cast doubt
on the legitimacy of categorical nonenforcement in the case of both
prosecutorial and administrative nonenforcement. Using various
methodologies such as examinations of the Take Care Clause, 12 sepa-
ration of powers principles, and the historical background of the Con-
stitution prior to, at the time of, and after the founding, constitutional
scholars have suggested, to varying degrees, that while abstention
from executing the law in certain cases may be required,13 complete,
prospective nonenforcement is an unconstitutional aggrandizement of
executive power. 14 To be sure, constitutional scholars have drawn sev-
9 E.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [hereinafter Marijuana Enforcement Memo];
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidance
Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical
Use (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-gui
dance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the
Medical Use of Marijuana 1-2 (Oct. 19,2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/fileslopa/
legacy/2009/1 0/19/medical-marijuana.pdf.
10 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
11 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., to Ins. Comm'rs (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-ll-14-2013.pdf; Notice 2013-45, 2013-
31 I.R.B. 116; Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed.
Reg. 8544, 8569 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, 301) (Feb. 12, 2014).
12 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (dictating that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed").
13 Scholars have often agreed that some amount of executive discretion regarding en-
forcement is inherent in the executive power. E.g., Price, note 2, at 675 (acknowledging
that "some degree of enforcement discretion is a natural incident of the core executive
function" and that such discretion is essential to protect liberty). The question of interest is
whether categorical nonenforcement is a legitimate means of exercising such discretion.
14 Constitutional scholars have drawn the line in different places in reaching this conclu-
sion. For instance, some scholars have argued that a "deliberate decision to leave a sub-
stantial area of statutory law unenforced or underenforced is a serious breach of
presidential duty." Delahunty & Yoo, note 2, at 785. Others have determined that there is
"a presumption against presidential authority to license legal violations or categorically
abstain from enforcement." E.g., Price, note 2, at 689. Indeed, even those supportive of
President Obama's policies have implicitly cast doubt on the legitimacy of categorical non-
enforcement by claiming that the Obama Administration has not engaged in categorical
nonenforcement, but rather simply was setting priorities. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, The Lib-
eral Fear of Obama's Executive Action Is Irrational, New Republic, Aug. 12, 2014, http://
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eral other distinctions to explain how certain types of nonenforcement
are more acceptable than others. First, scholars have reached a near
consensus that policy-based nonenforcement is impermissible,
whereas nonenforcement resulting from enforcement resource limita-
tions may be permissible.15 Second, some scholars have suggested
that time-limited nonenforcement may be more permissible than non-
enforcement not so limited.' 6 In any event, constitutional scholars
have set forth a general presumption that categorical nonenforcement,
and in particular policy-based categorical nonenforcement or categori-
cal nonenforcement that is not time limited, is deeply problematic.
Indeed, this view is so dominant that it seems to have motivated and
shaped the Obama Administration's own framing of its nonenforce-
ment policies. In the context of DACA, for example, the memo an-
nouncing the program repeatedly emphasizes that it is a simply a
means of setting priorities, for instance, by stating that the memo is
meant to ensure that "our enforcement resources are not expended on
these low priority cases but are instead appropriately focused on peo-
ple who meet our enforcement priorities.' 7 The memo even tries to
eschew any sense that it sets forth a policy of categorical nonenforce-
www.newrepublic.com/article/ 19057/obama-immigration-policy-critics-have-irrational-
fear-precedent; Eric A. Posner, Obama Is Legally Allowed to Enforce-or Not Enforce-
the Law, New Republic, Aug. 3, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118951/obamas-
immigration-policy-lawful-he-can-enforce-what-he-wants.
Two constitutional scholars have provided some support for categorical nonenforcement.
In a recent article, Michael Sant'Ambrogio discusses some of the benefits of what he calls
an extra-legislative veto, which includes, among many other things, the President's ability
not to enforce the law. Michael Sant'Ambrogio, The Extra-legislative Veto, 102 Geo. L.J.
351, 361 (2014). Addressing President Obama's immigration nonenforcement policies in
passing in an even more recent article, Gillian Metzger briefly mentioned the benefits of
categorical nonenforcement. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise,
124 Yale L.J. 1836, 1928-29 (2015). Both Sant'Ambrogio and Metzger focus principally on
presidentially directed nonenforcement and neither sets forth a framework for analyzing
nonenforcement through the lens of agency legitimacy, or provides detailed examples or
analyses of agency nonenforcement through such lens or through the alternative lenses.
This Article engages in that project.
15 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration, 90 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 802, 847-49 (2015); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing To Be Done:
An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to En-
force the Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 253, 265 (2003); Delahunty & Yoo, note 2, at 850;
Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112
Mich. L. Rev. 1195, 1216-17 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not To
Enforce, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 119. Love and Garg take a
slightly different view on this point than many others, in that they suggest that policy goals
for nonenforcement are problematic to the extent that the President chose inaction to pro-
mote "his own policy goals at the expense of Congress's." Love & Garg, supra, at 1220.
16 Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 403. Eric Posner has suggested that time limitations on
nonenforcement make a difference, explaining that, "[t]he president cannot suspend or
change the law: When he leaves office, the law will remain the same as it was, and the next
president will be free to enforce it or not." Posner, note 14.
17 Napolitano Memorandum, note 7, at 1.
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ment by stating that any relief from enforcement pursuant to the
memorandum will be decided "on a case by case basis."18 President
Obama has also emphasized that "[t]his is not a permanent fix, but
rather a temporary stop-gap measure . "..."19 In his announcement
regarding his more expansive immigration initiative, President Obama
similarly emphasized that "We'll prioritize, just like law enforcement
does every day,"'20 a sentiment echoed in the relevant DHS memoran-
dum delineating the policies, which carefully used case-by-case and
priorities language.21 By couching such policies in the language of set-
ting priorities, the Obama Administration has implicitly reflected the
view that uncabined categorical nonenforcement is particularly
suspect.
There is a separate, recent line of literature in the tax context that
has focused on the impropriety of categorical nonenforcement by the
IRS, although it has not been in conversation with the constitutional
dialogue regarding presidential nonenforcement. Most notably, in a
series of articles, Lawrence Zelenak has explored "customary devia-
tions," which he defines as, "an established practice of the tax admin-
istrators (the IRS and the Treasury Department) that deviates from
the clear dictates of the Internal Revenue Code."'22 Zelenak describes
customary deviations as distinct from "simple underenforcement of
the law without any indication (beyond the mere underenforcement)
18 Id. at 2.
19 Barack Obama, A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, Time, June 17, 2012,
http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/A-NATION-OF-LAWS-AND-A-NATION-OF-IMMI
GRANTS/.
20 Obama's Immigration Speech, note 8.
21 Johnson Memorandum, note 8, at 3 ("By this memorandum, I am now expanding.
certain parameters of DACA and issuing guidance for case-by-case use of deferred action
for those adults who have been in this country since January 1,2010, are the parents of U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who are otherwise not enforcement priorities
..... ). The Office of Legal Counsel opinion repeatedly emphasizes that the new policy
merely sets priorities and still allows case-by-case discretion. Memorandum from Karl R.
Thompson, Principal Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others 28-29
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/
20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [hereinafter OLC Opinion] ("And the case-by-
case discretion given to immigration officials under DHS's proposed program alleviates
potential concerns that DHS has abdicated its statutory enforcement responsibilities with
respect to, or created a categorical, rule-like entitlement to immigration relief for, the par-
ticular class of aliens eligible for the program."). For similar caveats in other nonenforce-
ment initiatives, see, for example, Cole Marijuana Enforcement Memo, note 9, at 1-2, 4;
Ogden Memorandum, note 9, at 1-2; see also note 11 and accompanying text (delineating
all of the temporary relief under the ACA as transitional and therefore time limited).
22 Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income
Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 833 (2012) [hereinafter Custom]; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Up in
the Air Over Taxing Frequent Flier Benefits: The American, Canadian, and Australian
Experiences, 9 Capital Markets L.J. 420, 425 (2014) [hereinafter Up in the Air].
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that the IRS acquiesces in widespread noncompliance, ' '2 3 making
Zelenak's customary deviations akin to the categorical nonenforce-
ment discussed in this Article.2 4 Zelenak concludes that "[t]o anyone
who takes the rule of law seriously, it is troubling to contemplate that
the Treasury and the IRS are almost unconstrained in their ability to
make de facto revisions to the Internal Revenue Code.... 25
III. INEVITAIE, SYSTEMATIC TAX LAW NONENFORCEMENT AT TIHE
HANDS OF TIlE IRS
What existing analyses have not done is evaluate executive nonen-
forcement of the law by considering how theories of agency legitimacy
apply to the realities of agency nonenforcement. This Article engages
in this analysis, motivated by the belief that, while it is all well and
good for commentators engaged in a high-stakes political debate to
imagine the President slashing the income tax through nonenforce-
ment, a comprehensive evaluation of executive nonenforcement
should be rooted at least in part in the realities of agency nonenforce-
ment that occur on a daily basis.
To delve into these realities, begin by indulging for a moment more
in another imaginary exercise. Imagine that, at the Hogwart's School
of Witchcraft and Wizardry, Hermione Granger faces the following
question on a final exam in her Muggle (nonwizard human) studies
class:26 Would the following items have to be included in income for
U.S. tax purposes: wages received by an employee of a large business,
payments for services made to a large partnership by a subsidiary
partnership, and frequent flier miles earned on business trips paid for
by the taxpayer's employer but used for personal purposes? Hermi-
one is an extremely diligent student, particularly well known for her
attention to detail. After doing a search to find the source of U.S. tax
law, Hermione turns to the Internal Revenue Code enacted by Con-
gress. The governing Code section dictates that "gross income means
all income from whatever source derived. '27 Being the excellent stu-
dent that she is, Hermione confirms that the Treasury Regulations af-
firm and expand on Congress' already expansive definition,28 and
23 Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 834.
24 Indeed, Zelenak focuses heavily on the example of frequent flier miles earned on
business trips paid for by the taxpayer's employer but used for personal purposes that also
is discussed to some extent in this Article. See id. at 830-32.
25 Id. at 851.
26 Those who are not familiar with Hermione Granger and the Hogwart's School of
Witchcraft and Wizardry can read the Harry Potter stories or find my son, who will recount
them endlessly.
27 IRC § 61.
28 Reg. § 1.61-1(a).
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even finds landmark cases interpreting the governing Code section
such as Glenshaw Glass, which inclusively describes gross income as
any "accessions to wealth, clearly realized ... over which the taxpay-
ers have complete dominion." 29 Hermione, having done an impres-
sive amount of due diligence, answers that all of the items have to be
included in income for U.S. tax purposes.
Unfortunately, Hermione would be wrong. Well, not wrong, ex-
actly. Technically, under the Code and all binding legal authorities, all
of the items listed should be considered income for tax purposes.
With respect to wages received by an employee of a large business and
payments for services made to a large partnership by a subsidiary
partnership, the Code section defining gross income (as "all income
from whatever source derived") controls, and there is no colorable
claim for an exclusion. While there might be some claim that the fre-
quent flier miles earned on business trips paid for by the taxpayer's
employer but used for personal purposes qualify for an exclusion from
gross income as a "de minimis fringe, ' 30 the general consensus of the
many scholars that have weighed in on the question is that this exclu-
sion does not apply and/or that the miles constitute gross income, 31
and the IRS has not claimed otherwise. 32 However, a particularly so-
phisticated answer to this tax question would have to consider the law
on the ground as well as the law on the books. In practice some items,
more than others, are likely to be included in income or be subject to
challenge as a result of noninclusion. In other words, the IRS will not
enforce inclusion in all cases that the Code at the very least arguably
calls for it.
Indeed, evidence of this nonenforcement exists. For example, re-
cent evidence suggests the IRS underenforces the tax law applicable-
to large partnerships. The audit rate of large partnerships (which are
defined as partnerships having $100 million or more in assets and 100
or more direct and indirect partners 33) has recently been a stagger-
ingly low .8%, 34 even though IRS agents and other knowledgeable
parties suggest that these partnerships have high tax noncompliance
29 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
30 IRC § 132(e)(1).
31 Zelenak, Up in the Air, note 22, at 422 n.8.
32 Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (Mar. 11) (indicating that the IRS will not
"assert that any taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by reason of the receipt or
personal use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind promotional benefits attributable to
the taxpayer's business or official travel.").
33 U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-14-746T, Large Partnerships: Growing Popula-
tion and Complexity Hinder Effective IRS Audits, Testimony Before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, U.S. Sen., Statement
of James R. White 2 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664917.pdf.
34 Id. at 10.
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potential3 5 and engage in aggressive noncompliant behavior. 36 In-
deed, Tax Notes' claim that "[tihese audit-proof partnerships essen-
tially shield the partner's income and deductions from challenge by
the IRS '' 37 echoes the case of IRS nonenforcement. In the case of
frequent flier miles earned on business trips paid for by the taxpayer's
employer but used for personal purposes, the only evidence needed to
demonstrate the IRS's nonenforcement is the agency's own state-
ment.38 Here, there is complete, prospective, nonenforcement of the
tax law.
Undergirding the IRS's nonenforcement is the crucial fact that the
Service has vastly insufficient resources to enforce the entirety of the
tax law against all taxpayers at all times.39 In light of the insufficient
resources available to the IRS relative to the extent of its enforcement
and other tasks, the tax law in practice must reflect a plethora of IRS
decisions about when and how to enforce the tax law.40 Indeed, in this
35 U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-14-732, Large Partnerships: With Growing
Number of Partnerships, IRS Needs to Improve Audit Efficiency 21, 25, 26, 30 (2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665886.pdf.
36 See, e.g., William R. Davis, Simplification and Compliance Are Goals of Partnership
Reform, 145 Tax Notes 373, 373-74 (Oct. 27, 2014) (quoting Kristine Roth, Legislation
Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation, who stated that if auditing rules were changed for
partnerships to make the auditing regime simpler, "taxpayers may not take the same ag-
gressive positions as they would if there was not audit risk"); Monte A. Jackel, Potential
Concerns with Auditing Large Partnerships, 145 Tax Notes 855 (Nov. 17,2014) (identifying
large partnership issues). As part of a detailed study of TEFRA, Noel Brock recently
concluded that an overhauled regime "can help increase not only the audit rates of large
partnerships but also the change rates of the returns audited." Noel P. Brock, Auditing
Large Partnerships and TEFRA: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, The Univer-
sity of Chicago 67th Tax Conference 52 (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/
file/auditinglargepartnershipsandtefra.pdf.
37 Audit Proof: The Other IRS Scandal (Apr. 7, 2014), 2014 TNT 66-69, available at
LEXIS, Tax Analyst File, video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROTrgc
D_n9g.
38 See note 32.
39 John A. Koskinen, IRS 2015 Budget Cut Is "Troubling Development," Koskinen Says
(Dec. 17, 2014), 2014 TNT 243-12, available at LEXIS, Tax Analyst File; Testimony of John
A. Koskinen Before the Sen. Fin. Comm. 3 (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.finance.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/JAK_.Opening-statementFINAL.PDF ("I have met with every IRS Com-
missioner from the past 20 years and the consensus was that a major challenge and con-
straint was the funding limitations they faced. This is a view shared today by the IRS
Oversight Board, the Taxpayer Advocate and, most recently, the Treasury Inspector Gen-
eral for Tax Administration (TIGTA) and the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Coun-
cil."); National Taxpayer Advocate, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, The IRS
Desperately Needs More Funding to Serve Taxpayers and Increase Voluntary Compliance
27 (2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/IRS-BUD
GET-The-I RS-Desperately-Needs-More-Funding-to-Serve-Taxpayers-and-Increase-Vol-
untary-Compliance.pdf.
40 Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an IRS Duty
of Consistency, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 317, 346 (2006) ("Congress has granted discretion to the
Service by promulgating a set of revenue laws so voluminous as to be humanly unenforce-
able."); Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99
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regard, the IRS faces an enforcement dilemma of Congress' own
making.41
To be sure, in some cases the nonenforcement may reflect not only
enforcement resource limitations, but also other considerations, such
as uncertainty regarding the scope of the law. Some might distinguish
between nonenforcement decisions motivated by this uncertainty and
nonenforcement decisions that instead are motivated by administra-
tive or other difficulties. For instance, some might argue that in the
case of frequent flier miles, the IRS's nonenforcement announcement
may have reflected some uncertainty about the extent to which the
definition of gross income really does cover such frequent flier miles.42
This Article does not distinguish between nonenforcement that is mo-
tivated by uncertainty about the scope of the law and nonenforcement
that is motivated by administrative or other difficulties because, as ex-
plained in more detail later, this often will be an indeterminate line-
drawing exercise.43 Even more fundamentally, I do not attempt to
draw this distinction because doing so would not change my central
inquiry: In light of the fact that agencies must make nonenforcement
decisions that shape the scope of the law on the ground, how can
agencies make such decisions legitimately?
There are various means of making the inevitable nonenforcement
decisions.44 While this list is by no means inclusive, three principal
ways to direct nonenforcement are categorical nonenforcement, set-
ting priorities, and case-by-case decisionmaking. In the context of tax
law nonenforcement, categorical nonenforcement involves a high-
level decision not to enforce some aspect of the law for some specified
period of time or until future notice. A prime example of categorical
Cornell L. Rev. Online 41, 41 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/09/99CLR
0411.pdf ("To perform its Augean task with constrained resources, the IRS must be al-
lowed to exercise discretion.")
41 In the tax context the insufficient enforcement resources and procedural limitations
on enforcement may even serve an ideological objective. See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Why
the GOP Really Wants to Defund the IRS, Wash. Post (July 1, 2014), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/01/why-the-gop-really-wants-to-defund-irs/ (ar-
guing that congressional attempts to defund the IRS are "just a different way to try to
shrink government, accommodate tax evasion and even undermine the implementation of
health reform").
42 See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Standards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 Duke L.J. Online 53, 54-55 & n.6
(2015), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?atyicle=1 005&context=DL
j.online (disputing Zelenak's characterizations of customary deviations as, instead, neces-
sary interpretations of the Code).
43 See text accompanying notes 221-24.
4 Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
Yale L.J. 1032, 1037-38 (2011) (describing different contributors to agency decisionmaking,
with varying levels of influence or authority).
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nonenforcement is the frequent flier miles example discussed above. 45
Other examples exist as well.46
The IRS can also direct nonenforcement by setting priorities. Set-
ting priorities allows high-level decisions to allocate enforcement re-
sources toward one set of tax issues or taxpayers and away from
others. Examples, and different iterations of setting priorities,
abound. One particularly notable example was the tiering of issues in
the large business and international division (LB&I) of the IRS, which
occurred from 2006 through 2012 through the Industry Issue Focus
("IIF") program. 47 Through this program, the IRS centrally created
priorities for examination in LB&I as a means of directing enforce-
ment resources toward the greatest, perceived compliance risks.48
Setting priorities also can occur through centralized, though not nec-
essarily controlling, advice to tax agents. 49 Centralized allocation of
enforcement resources also can serve as a means of setting priorities.
The allocation of enforcement resources as between large partner-
ships and corporations serves as an example of setting priorities as
between different return categories.5 ° All of these methods of allocat-
ing enforcement resources, whether at a high level of resource alloca-
tion among enforcement categories or at the lower level of resource
allocation to particular returns or issues, direct tax enforcement to-
ward certain taxpayers and away from others. Indeed, while setting
priorities often takes the nominal form of directing tax enforcement
resources toward certain taxpayers, in a world of insufficient enforce-
ment resources this very direction has the impact of making other tax-
45 Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (Mar. 11).
46 E.g., Notice 2011-89, 2011-46 I.R.B. 748 (providing for the nonenforcement of certain
penalties related to "information returns and payee statements pertaining to reportable
payments made in calendar year 2011," stating that the IRS "will not impose penalties
under sections 6721 and 6722 on payors that must file information returns and payee state-
ments provided that they make good-faith efforts in filing accurate Forms 1099-K and fur-
nishing the accompanying payee statements."). This, of course, is an instance of transition
relief, much like the delay of various provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act mentioned earlier. Examining the extent to which transition relief raises unique
issues is outside of the scope of this Article but may merit examination in future work.
47 IRS, Internal Revenue Manual § 4.5.1, http://www.irs.gov/.irm_04-005-001.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2015) (providing rules and procedures for IIF program).
48 David B. Blair & George A. Hani, LMSB's Industry Issue Focus Approach, Tax Exec-
utive, May-June, 2007, at 237, 237.
49 For instance, in the context of medical expenses, the Internal Revenue Manual (which
is a compilation of internal IRS guidelines) advises agents that examining "[h]igh medical
expenses for large families, deceased taxpayers, or older taxpayers" is usually not produc-
tive. IRS, Internal Revenue Manual § 4.1.5.1.11.1.4, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-
001-005.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
50 In terms of individual tax return selection, perhaps the most notable example of set-
ting priorities is the discriminant index function (DIF), "a mathematical technique used to
score income tax returns for examination potential." IRS, Internal Revenue Manual
§ 4.1.3.2, http://www.irs.gov.irn/part4/irm_04-001-003.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
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payers less likely to be subject to review.51 To some extent, the
reduced attention to certain taxpayers will map onto the likelihood of
higher compliance exhibited by such taxpayers.52 However, the large
difference between what taxpayers owe and what they pay, even after
all IRS enforcement action, indicates that much tax law nonenforce-
ment exists,53 and that setting priorities allocates nonenforcement to-
ward certain taxpayers, tax issues, or tax returns and away from
others.
Finally, case-by-case decisionmaking can best be understood as the
decisions made by individual tax agents. To use Dworkin's famous
metaphor, case-by-case decisionmaking is the doughnut hole of discre-
tion that exists as an area left open by surrounding restrictions. 54 In
this case, the surrounding restrictions are the decisions made by cate-
gorical decisionmaking and setting priorities. Whatever discretion
such higher level decisions leave open can be resolved by case-by-case
decisionmaking.
Although some case-by-case decisionmaking will remain inevitable
in the tax enforcement system,55 the IRS must direct tax law nonen-
forcement at least to some extent through more high-level, centralized
mechanisms such as categorical decisionmaking and setting priorities.
The IRS must do so in order to efficiently direct its resources in the
sprawling tax enforcement system, which includes approximately
85,000 employees spread across the country responsible for adminis-
tering essentially all U.S. federal taxes owed by many different types
of taxpayers.56 As with any sprawling bureaucracy, high-level controls
51 Indeed, this is the intuition behind taxpayers trying to avoid "red flags" that will make
them more likely to be subject to review. See, e.g., Joy Taylor, 15 Reasons You Might Get
Audited, Kiplinger, http://www.kiplinger.com/slideshow/taxes/T056-SO01-irs-audit-red-
flags-the-dirty-dozen-slide-show/ (last updated Mar. 2015).
52 See text accompanying notes 58-60 for a discussion of how high-level direction of
enforcement resources helps direct tax enforcement most effectively.
53 This (the difference between amount owed and amount paid, even after IRS enforce-
ment) is known as the net tax gap. For the tax year 2006, the net tax gap was estimated to
be $385 billion. IRS, Tax Gap "Map" Tax Year 2006 (Dec. 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/
newsroom/taxgapmap 2006.pdf.
54 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31 (1977).
55 For example, the Internal Revenue Manual describes that, while DIF scoring is calcu-
lated by computer, "[e]ach selected DIF return will be screened by an experienced exam-
iner to eliminate those returns not worthy of examination," and that such determination is
made based on the examiner's "skills, technical expertise, local knowledge, and experience
to identify hidden, as well as obvious, issues." IRS, Internal Revenue Manual § 4.1.5.1.5.1,
http://www.irs.gov/irmlpart4/irm_04-001 005.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015); cf. Kenneth
Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 43-44 (1969) (describing, with
respect to administrative agencies generally, that "[t]o fix as the goal the elimination of all
discretion on all subjects would be utter insanity").
56 IRS Data Book tbl.30 (2014), showing an average of 84,133 employees used to con-
duct IRS operations in 2014 fiscal year, https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Personnel-
Summary-by-Employment-Status-Budget-Activity-and-Selected-Type-of-Personne-Data
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are essential to keep enforcement allocation in line with the priorities
that high-level research determines are most important. The IRS
therefore has an Office of Research that is responsible for, among
many other things, "[d]eveloping, maintaining, and advising on meth-
ods for selecting taxpayers and issues for enforcement contact and for
allocating IRS resources. '57
In terms of determining what priorities are most important, the IRS
has to take into account that it is responsible for enforcement of the
tax laws for taxpayers with extremely different profiles and inclina-
tions toward tax compliance. In terms of individual taxpayers, while
some taxpayers are inclined to cheat on their taxes if given the oppor-
tunity, for a variety of reasons others pay their taxes despite the op-
portunity to cheat.58 Abstracting up a level from individual
differences to different sectors of taxpayers, differing opportunities
for tax evasion as well as differing norms of compliance result in sec-
tors of taxpayers having vastly different compliance rates.59 And, per-
haps most crucially, as a result of vastly different tax dollars at stake in
various tax sectors with different relative costs of enforcement, the
return on IRS enforcement resources varies widely among these tax-
payer sectors. Most notably, the IRS uses approximately 20% of its
resources for audits of the largest business taxpayers, but such audits
yield approximately 66% of recommended tax from IRS audits.60 The
underlying point is that not all tax enforcement is likely to be equal.
As a result, and motivated by a variety of considerations, the IRS has
to use either categorical decisionmaking or setting priorities at least to
some extent to direct its limited tax enforcement resources toward
their preferred uses. While this high-level direction of tax law nonen-
forcement can serve a variety of salutary purposes, it also means that
unelected tax administrators affect the tax law on the ground in im-
portant ways.
book-Table-30. Some limited exceptions apply to the IRS's general responsibility for ad-
ministering all federal taxes. For example, the Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) ad-
ministers alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and ammunition taxes. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau, TTB's Responsibilities-What We Do, http://www.ttb.gov/consumer/re-
sponsibilities.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2015).
57 IRS, Internal Revenue Manual § 1.1.18.1.3.4B, http://www.irs.gov/irm/partl/irm_01-
001-018.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
58 See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target
Tax Enforcement, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 694-701 (2009) (describing different types of
taxpayers and inclinations towards compliance).
59 IRS, Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006: Overview 2 (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/
newsroom/overviewjtax-gap_2006.pdf (showing different rates of noncompliance with re-
spect to different types of income, generated in different taxpayer sectors).
60 See Michael 1. Saltzman & Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure 8.15[1] (2013).
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IV. AGENCY LEGITIMACY AND CATEGORICAL NONENFORCEMENT
If unelected tax administrators affect the tax law on the ground in
important ways through inevitable nonenforcement of aspects of the
tax law, are there more or less legitimate ways for them to engage in
this nonenforcement? One way to answer this question is by looking
to modern theories of agency legitimacy and asking how different
means of engaging in such nonenforcement of the law may be more or
less legitimate. 61 This approach may be particularly enlightening be-
cause, as is evident in the discussion below, the theories attempt to
apply core principles of democratic governance, which arguably are
rooted in fundamental U.S. constitutional values, to the realities of the
current administrative state. As a result, wrestling with how the theo-
ries comport with categorical nonenforcement may bring to bear in-
sights regarding core values of democratic governance that are
obscured or missed by existing analyses. This Part sets forth the
prominent, modern theories of agency legitimacy, and explores why,
under such theories, categorical nonenforcement may help legitimize
the IRS's inevitable nonenforcement of the tax law.
In this regard, it is helpful to clarify that claiming an agency action is
legitimate or that certain action, such as categorical nonenforcement,
promotes agency legitimacy does not mean that it is normatively desir-
able. In fact, the agency action, such as categorical nonenforcement,
may be lamentable and problematic in that ideally the agency would
not have to make systematic nonenforcement decisions. Rather, ex-
amining agency legitimacy requires first accepting as a given that U.S.
governmental agencies will be exercising extensive power, such as sys-
tematically not enforcing the law. With that assumption, the examina-
tion of agency legitimacy asks how such power can be exercised in a
manner that assures that there are adequate checks in place to ensure
exercises of the power are consistent with democratic governance. 62
A. Theories of Agency Legitimacy
The central question for agency legitimacy is how to justify the ex-
tensive power and responsibilities of administrative agencies in U.S.
constitutional democracy. While some scholars simply reject modern
administrative agencies as unconstitutional, 63 the reality is that the ex-
tensive administrative bureaucracy responsible for running much of
61 This Article returns to alternative approaches, other than agency legitimacy, in Part
V.
62 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legiti-
macy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 490-91 (2003).
63 E.g. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1231, 1231 (1994) ("The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its
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the U.S. government exercises significant power all the time, and such
exercise is widely seen as crucial to the functioning of the govern-
ment.64 As a result, administrative and constitutional law scholars
have developed theories to support agency legitimacy. While there
are certainly many variations of the central question regarding agency
legitimacy, each theory of agency legitimacy attempts to explain in its
own way how administrative agencies can operate consistently with
constitutional or democratic principles.65
There are three principal modern theories of agency legitimacy,
each of which is examined here: the political accountability theory,
civic republicanism, and nonarbitrariness theory. 66 Political accounta-
bility theory relies on agencies being subject to the control of politi-
cally accountable, elected officials. 67 In standard accounts of political
validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional
revolution.").
64 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[I]n our increasingly com-
plex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.").
65 See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1276, 1284 (1984) ("Each model of bureaucratic legitimacy is a story designed to tell
its listeners: 'Don't worry, bureaucratic organizations are under control."'); Nina A. Men-
delson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President
Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 577 (2003) ("In my view, legitimacy can be assessed by
answering two component questions: (1) Can agency power be characterized as demo-
cratic, especially if Congress, the closest institution to the electorate, is not making key
policy decisions, and (2) are agencies accountable for the power they exercise?"); Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667,
1672-73 (1975) ("Coercive controls on private conduct must be authorized by the legisla-
ture, and, under the doctrine against delegation of legislative power, the legislature must
promulgate rules, standards, goals, or some 'intelligible principle' to guide the exercise of
administrative power.").
66 Judicial review is examined separately in the text accompanying notes 175-97. Other
theories that do not hold as much current sway, such as the transmission belt model, the
expertise model, and the pluralist model are not examined in detail. For discussions see,
for example, James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 23-25 (1938) (describing the
expertise model); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2253
(2001) (describing the transmission belt model); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for
Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 Admin. L.
Rev. 343, 357 (2009) (describing the transmission belt model); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1513 (1992)
(describing the pluralist model). To some extent even these older theories of agency legiti-
macy have not gone away entirely, but rather have been subsumed to various degrees in
the current, dominant theories.
67 This theory has gone by many names (and, to some extent the differing names reflect
slight, underlying differences). See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Delib-
erative Model of the Administrative State, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1397, 1400 (2013)
(describing the "political control" model). I have adopted Lisa Bressman's terminology of
"political accountability," although Bressman also includes in this term certain older theo-
ries of agency legitimacy that have been set aside in note 66. Lisa Schultz Bress-
man, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1657, 1675 (2004).
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accountability theory, elections are important for two reasons. First,
under the majoritarian paradigm popularized by Alexander Bickel,
democratic legitimacy exists to the extent that government officials
represent majority will, and elections are the means of ensuring such
representation. 68 Second, and relatedly, elections are a means of
checking government officials and voting out of office officials who
did not, in fact, represent majority will.69 At first glance, the power
held by administrative agencies to substantially affect rights and obli-
gations under the law is suspect because administrative officials are
not elected and therefore lack the democratic legitimacy conferred by
elections. Political accountability theory solves this problem by posit-
ing that administrative agencies are controlled by the President and/or
Congress.70 Subjecting agencies to such control legitimates them by
positing that agencies are indirect representatives of majority will in
the first instance and indirectly subject to electoral checks on the
backend, because elected officials can be held accountable for deci-
sions made by administrative agencies.71 Bickel even foreshadowed
the application of the political accountability theory to the administra-
tive state by defending delegations to administrators in part on the
grounds that administrative decisions were reversible by officials
elected by majorities. 72
While some scholars have focused on Congress' role in controlling
administrative agencies, 73 in recent years the tide of political account-
68 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics 16-23 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (setting forth highly influential ac-
count of judicial review as countermajoritarian, which helped create a majoritarian para-
digm of democratic legitimacy). For an influential account of the majoritarian paradigm,
see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Forward: The Vanishing Con-
stitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 61-96 (1989).
69 Bickel, note 68, at 27.
70 See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No
Stranger, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 557, 568 (1987) ("We vote for presidents, not secretaries or
administrators .... White House oversight places accountability precisely where it should
be, namely, where the electorate can do something about it"); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 85-119 (1994) (argu-
ing that administrative agencies have to be accountable and therefore subject to presiden-
tial control).
71 Bressman, note 62, at 490-91.
72 Bickel, note 68, at 19-20.
73 For a small sample of this literature (and evaluations of it) see, for example, Joel D.
Aberbach, Keeping A Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight 14, 34-37
(1990); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61,122-30
(2006); Kagan, note 66, at 2255-60 (describing views that Congress did not effectively con-
trol administrative policymaking, later political science literature suggesting the opposite,
and why neither view in the extreme is likely to be correct); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger
G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 440-44 (1989);
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
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ability scholarship has favored a presidential control model, which
looks principally to the President to control administrative agencies. 74
There were interrelated developments that led to the rise of the presi-
dential control model. First, constitutional theorists made a variety of
arguments in defense of a unitary executive, either based on a belief
that the Framers themselves constitutionalized the unitary executive,
or because the unitary executive was believed to be the best transla-
tion of the Framers' vision into modern context.75 Second, and relat-
edly, scholars began looking to the modern presidency as a
particularly good nexus of control for the administrative state as a re-
sult of the President representing a national constituency and having
the position and energy to direct and control the widespread adminis-
trative state.76 Finally, Presidents themselves began asserting their
role as chief executives of the administrative state, a trend that helped
explain scholars' increasing attention to the presidency as a source of
control.77 In any event, political accountability theory more generally
looks to either or both of the two politically accountable branches, the
President and/or Congress, to control, answer for, and thereby legiti-
mize administrative agencies. 78
The second principal modern theory used to support agency legiti-
macy, often called civic republicanism, emphasizes an agency's delib-
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 252 (1987); Mathew D. McCub-
bins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 174-75 (1984); Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Posi-
tive Theory of "Congressional Dominance," 12 Legis. Stud. Q. 475, 477-90 (1987); Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regula-
tory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 766-75 (1983).
74 Bressman, note 67, at 1677 ("All or nearly all scholars-whether originalists or
pragmatists, Democrats or Republicans-now endorse the presidential control model as a
critical means for enhancing agency legitimacy."); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the
Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 988
(1997) ("Increasingly, scholars (and, at times, the judiciary) look to the President ... to
supply the elusive essence of democratic legitimation.").
75 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 551-56 (1994) (for the former view); Lessig & Sunstein,
note 70 (for the latter view).
76 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance: Using Public Choice to
Improve Public Law 152 (1997) (describing "vague delegations to administrative agencies
... as a device for facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential
elections"); Kagan, note 66, at 2253; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985).
77 For a particularly notable description of this trend, see Kagan, note 66, at 2272-319.
Indeed, administrative law now deeply reflects the perceived importance of presidential
control. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (explaining that courts should defer to agency interpretations because "[w]hile
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices .... ").
78 Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 Yale L.J. 2, 35-37 (2009).
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erative process as the source of its legitimacy. 79 Civic republicanism is
borne out of a historical view of the Framers' dedication to delibera-
tive democracy.80 Although it is difficult to define as a result of differ-
ing accounts, as a general matter civic republican theory posits that
government should enable consensus about the "common good,"
which can be "found at the conclusion of a well-functioning delibera-
tive process." 81 Civic republicanism rejects governance that merely
seeks to satisfy or aggregate exogenous individual preferences,82 and
instead heralds government that reaches the right outcomes through a
reasoned process, informed by transformative public debate that ex-
tends beyond mere self-interest.83 In such a process, government poli-
cies are "justified rather than simply fought for," 84  and the
government provides explanations for how its decisions further the
common good. 85 The case for the application of civic republicanism to
agencies specifically is that agencies are subject to checks by the judi-
ciary, Congress, and the President that can help ensure politically in-
formed discourse, agencies' bureaucratic structures can focus debate
on the public interest, and many agency decisions are subject to proce-
dures that can facilitate a reasoned process of deliberation. 86 As
Mark Seidenfeld has described, "[tihe deliberative promise of the ad-
ministrative state stems from the fact that agency decisionmaking can
79 Mendelson, note 65, at 585. For a foundational work on civic republicanism, see
Seidenfeld, note 66. This theory, too, has gone by different names that reflect, to some
extent, different emphases. See, e.g., Mantel, note 66, at 362-65 (exploring what she calls
the "trustee paradigm").
80 See, e.g., Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Re-
publican Government, in How Democratic Is the Constitution? 102 (Robert A. Goldwin &
William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
81 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988)
[hereinafter Republican Revival]; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Prefer-
ences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1154-55 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Interference] (explaining
that "one of the most important functions of politics is the selection, evaluation, and shap-
ing of preferences, not simply their implementation"). There is extensive literature by
prominent legal scholars regarding civic republicanism, and its role in the formulation of
government in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 191-246 (1988); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1016-23 (1984); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1503-07 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 35-48 (1985) [hereinafter Interest
Groups]. The legal literature builds on historical literature regarding the influence of re-
publicanism on the U.S. constitutional scheme. See, e.g., Bessette, note 80.
82 Michelman, note 81, at 1526-28; Sunstein, Republican Revival, note 81, at 1548-49;
Sunstein, Interest Groups, note 81, at 32; Sunstein, Legal Interference, note 81, at 1135.
83 Sunstein, Republican Revival, note 81, at 1549.
84 Sunstein, Legal Interference, note 81, at 1155.
85 Seidenfeld, note 66, at 1530.
86 Id. at 1541-62. This is certainly not to say that agencies are perfect at this task.
Rather, the argument is that they are well-suited relative to alternatives.
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be inclusive, knowledgeable, reasoned, and transformative. '87 In-
deed, Seidenfeld has claimed that "having administrative agencies set
government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic re-
publicanism's call for deliberative decisionmaking informed by the
values of the entire polity."'88
Finally, the third principal modern theory of agency legitimacy may
be called the nonarbitrariness theory. Nonarbitrariness theory is
rooted in the concerns that prominent early administrative law schol-
ars, such as Henry Friendly, Kenneth Davis, and Louis Jaffe, had
about excessive agency discretion.89 In controlling such discretion,
nonarbitrariness theory departs from political accountability theory's
fixation on the majority will, arguing in part that the Framers did not
believe that majority will was sufficient to ensure public-regarding law
and individual rights, and instead worried about the deleterious ef-
fects of majority factions and tyrannous rule.90
As one might expect, nonarbitrariness theory rejects arbitrary ad-
ministrative action as an illegitimate exercise of government power.
A quintessential example of arbitrary administrative action would be
action that deviates from the application of a general, acceptable gov-
ernance policy, and instead is explained by an improper motive such
as disdain for the regulated party at hand, or a desire to provide bene-
ficial treatment to a powerful special interest.91 In contrast to such
illegitimate action, nonarbitrariness theory heralds administration of
the law that ensures that individual agency decisions are made in ac-
cordance with public-regarding, generalizable policies and principles.
87 Seidenfeld, note 67, at 1426.
88 Seidenfeld, note 66, at 1515.
89 For seminal works, see Davis, note 55; Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards (1962); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action (1965).
90 Bressman, note 62, at 493-94, 497-500; Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Or-
dered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1531-35 (1991) (exploring how Framers' concerns
about tyranny can be understood as concerns about arbitrary government action). More
generally, the literature regarding how best to understand the Framers' concerns regarding
factions and tyranny, and the resulting structure of government embodied in the Constitu-
tion, is extraordinarily vast. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (J.R.
Pole ed., 2005) ("[T]he majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be ren-
dered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes
of oppression."); Id. No. 51; M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1132-46 (2000) (describing and critiquing extensive sepa-
ration of powers literature and concern about tyranny); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
573, 640-66 (1984) (providing seminal functionalist view of how separation of powers
should be applied to the administrative state); Sunstein, Interest Groups, note 81, at 31-48
(exploring Framers' concerns regarding factions).
91 See Friendly, note 89, at 19 (describing "the basic human claim that the law should
provide like treatment under like circumstances").
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In this way, nonarbitrariness theory posits that nonarbitrary adminis-
trative action, which has qualities of being "rational, predictable, or
fair,"' 92 is central not only to good governance but also to constitution-
ally legitimate governance. 93
The three theories of agency legitimacy laid out above are certainly
far from unassailable. As one would expect from any theory that at-
tempts to explain how modern government should accord with consti-
tutional and democratic commitments, the theories of agency
legitimacy set forth have been subject to a variety of significant coun-
terclaims by scholars of all sorts.94 Indeed, as alluded to in the discus-
sion of nonarbitrariness theory, the theories themselves offer
alternative, and sometimes conflicting, visions of legitimate govern-
ance and agencies' place in it. On the other hand, the theories may
also overlap in ways that provide mutually reinforcing support for
agency legitimacy. For instance, oversight and boundary setting by
the politically accountable branches are most relevant for political ac-
countability theory, but these constraints may also help ensure the
proper functioning of the deliberative process that supports agency
legitimacy under civic republicanism. 95 In any event, I do not seek to
debate the extent to which the theories set forth above can legitimize
the administrative state, but rather posit as a working assumption that
there are prominent theories, rooted in constitutional and democratic
values, that are used to assess agency legitimacy, and evaluate categor-
ical nonenforcement in light of them.
B. Application to Categorical Nonenforcement
This Section argues that, under these three principal modern theo-
ries of agency legitimacy, categorical nonenforcement in some circum-
stances may actually promote the legitimacy of the IRS's inevitable,
systematic tax law nonenforcement. Specifically, as a result of in-
creasing the salience of nonenforcement decisions and by serving as a
means of committing the agency to a policy of nonenforcement, cate-
92 Bressman, note 62, at 496.
93 Id. at 494.
94 For several examples of various counterclaims, see Edward Rubin, The Myth of Ac-
countability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2083 (2005)
("Thus, control over the bureaucracy is exercised by the president according to the succes-
sion principle ... but not according to the electoral accountability principle."); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 55 (2008)
(arguing that "a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation alleviates rather than exacer-
bates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking"). The cri-
tiques cannot easily be characterized, because they respond to different theories of agency
legitimacy.
95 Seidenfeld, note 67, at 1448-53.
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gorical nonenforcement, under certain circumstances, may increase
the accountability, deliberation, and nonarbitrariness of an agency's
inevitable nonenforcement of the law.
As an initial matter, categorical nonenforcement can increase the
salience of nonenforcement decisions, making it more likely that the
politically accountable branches and the public will focus on them. In
general, even significant instances of nonenforcement can be difficult
for politically accountable actors and the public to monitor. Unlike
when an agency decides to engage in a new enforcement project, or a
new initiative, nonenforcement is much more likely to occur sub rosa,
and thereby evade attention and review.96 Categorical nonenforce-
ment can buck this tendency by providing a particularly transparent
statement of nonenforcement. 97 Even if it is clear, for example, that
the IRS historically has not enforced and, in all likelihood, will not
enforce the tax law with respect to a certain issue, the Service's cate-
gorical statement that it will not enforce the law with respect to such
issue nonetheless spotlights its choice, providing a particularly salient
notice of its nonenforcement. 98
Whereas setting a low priority can also indicate that enforcement is
going to be low, categorical nonenforcement is likely to have a greater
ability to focus attention on what, in any event, is a low likelihood of
enforcement. Indicating that a particular enforcement task is a low
priority may not communicate with precision the extent of the nonen-
forcement. 99 Indicating that a particular enforcement task is low pri-
ority can also provide cover to disguise what, in reality, is virtually no
enforcement. 100 Even to the extent that the low priority is translated
into a specific level of enforcement, the formality and extremity of a
statement of complete, categorical nonenforcement nonetheless will
tend to increase its salience.
Increasing the salience of a nonenforcement decision can serve as a
means to increase the accountability, and therefore legitimacy, of
agency nonenforcement.'0 1 There are two mechanisms at work that
96 Love & Garg, note 15, at 1235.
97 See, e.g., text accompanying note 38.
98 As Colin Diver has more generally remarked with respect to administrative rules,
"[tlransparent rules tend to spotlight a value choice." Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Preci-
sion of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65, 106 (1983).
99 For instance, the tiering program in LB&I by negative implication alerted taxpayers
to issues that would not be high priorities for review. See text accompanying note 46.
However, this guidance provided only very vague information that these other issues
would be less likely to be reviewed. Id.
100 This might be an intentional choice designed to protect compliance. See text accom-
panying note 248.
101 Cf. Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 795, 820 (2010) ("Binding enforcement directives, promulgated through rulemaking,
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enable greater salience of nonenforcement to increase accountability
of nonenforcement. First, more salient nonenforcement decisions can
focus the politically accountable branches' attention on the nonen-
forcement, thereby increasing their likelihood of exerting control over
the nonenforcement decision. Presidents in particular have a variety
of means to monitor different agency action.102 For instance, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) implements the President's
vision across the Executive Branch, including through oversight of
agency performance and review of all significant federal regulations
by executive agencies.'0 3 However, agency enforcement decisions for
the most part fall outside of centralized presidential review. 104 More
salient statements of nonenforcement can overcome this tendency,
thereby becoming more likely to trigger review by the President, Con-
gress, or, perhaps more realistically, their central apparatuses respon-
sible for monitoring administrative agencies.' Os The greater likelihood
of control or review of the nonenforcement decisions by the politically
accountable branches promotes legitimacy under the political ac-
countability theory because the politically accountable branches may
help ensure that even unelected agencies make decisions in accor-
dance with majority preferences. 10 6
The second way that greater salience of a nonenforcement decision
can increase accountability is by increasing the visibility of the deci-
sion to the public. Political accountability theory, after all, relies in
part on the notion that government actors should be carrying out ma-
jority will, and that the public can hold politicians accountable for
their failure to do So. 1 0 7 By making nonenforcement decisions more
salient to the public, as well as to the politically accountable branches,
categorical nonenforcement can increase the likelihood that the public
require agencies, and the administration to which they are accountable, to take a public
stand on their enforcement priorities.").
102 There is more debate about the extent to which Congress can effectively monitor
administrative agencies. See note 73.
103 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management
and Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization-mission/ (last visited Sept. 8,
2015).
104 Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031, 1033
(2013).
105 While OMB may be very much like another administrative agency, it nonetheless is
charged with carrying out the President's vision more directly. Id. at 1104; Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, note 103 ("The core mission of OMB is to serve the President of the United
States in implementing his vision across the Executive Branch.").
106 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1137-38 (2010) (making this point with respect to presidential
control); Metzger, note 14, at 44-45 (explaining that "internal administrative oversight is
equally required to ensure that policies and priorities specified by elected leaders are actu-
ally followed on the ground.").
107 See text accompanying notes 68-69.
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registers nonenforcement decisions, expresses satisfaction or dissatis-
faction with such decisions, and holds the politically accountable
branches accountable for the actual implementation of the law (or
lack thereof). 10 8
While the notion that the public actually holds politically accounta-
ble branches responsible for individual agency decisions (or nonen-
forcement decisions, in this case) is certainly highly contested,109 it
reflects a more deep-seated intuition that the politically accountable
branches can and should be held responsible, at some level, for the
actual implementation of the law. In this context, to the extent that
the politically accountable branches do not respond to a statement of
categorical nonenforcement, the categorical nonenforcement may at
least force a politically accountable acknowledgement of the unwill-
ingness to provide the means necessary to yield adequate enforce-
ment. Categorical nonenforcement thereby may serve as a counter to
one of the most troublesome, potential legitimacy threats of the ad-
ministrative state: The ability of Congress and/or the President to gar-
ner the benefits of a public-regarding law that they ensure never
actually comes to pass by putting in place low-visibility constraints on
the implementing agency. 110
As an example of salience triggering ultimate, accountable review
of a nonenforcement decision, take the example of large partnerships.
As described previously, the IRS has engaged in extremely low rates
of audits of large partnerships."' These statistics can be explained, at
least in part, by the difficulty in auditing large partnerships. The Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") imposed
very onerous requirements on the IRS for auditing large partnerships,
significantly limiting the Service's audit capacity for these entities and
making the IRS hesitant to conduct large partnership audits." 2 Vari-
108 Metzger, note 14, at 45 (explaining that political accountability also involves "al-
lowing the public to be informed about administrative actions .... ").
109 See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 Minn. L. Rev.
1253, 1266 (2009) ("In short, the presumption that elected officials are politically accounta-
ble for their specific policy decisions is wildly unrealistic."); Farina, note 74, at 997-1002
(describing how bundling and complexity make it difficult to know what citizens want on
particular issues or to hold the President responsible for them).
110 See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60
Admin. L. Rev. 1, 46 (2008) ("In essence, agencies and Congress can use the symbolic
substantive statute, filled with public interest language that promises action on a particular
issue, to 'mask' the actual implementation that betrays that promise-and thereby reduce
or eliminate any political costs for failing to address the substantive question.").
111 See text accompanying notes 34-36.
112 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 112th Cong., Description of Revenue Provisions
Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposal 616-18, 624 (June 2012),
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113JPRT85812/pdf/CPRT-113JPRT85812.pdf; Brock, note
36, at 42 (providing anecdotal evidence to this effect).
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ous other aspects of large partnership tax return filing also created
information deficits for the IRS.113 On top of these difficulties, large
partnerships can make extremely complicated even the most funda-
mental aspects of a tax audit, such as determining the tax partner re-
sponsible for working with the IRS to facilitate an audit. 14 For years,
the IRS allocated insufficient enforcement resources to overcome
such difficulties, which resulted in an extremely low audit rate for
large partnerships.11 5
Recently, however, media coverage of the very low rate of partner-
ship audits increased awareness of the issue, and even framed it in
seemingly categorical terms. An example of such media coverage in-
cludes a You Tube video created by Tax Analysts, designed to explain
the large partnership nonenforcement to the public, in a way that
made it seem essentially categorical. 116 The You Tube video ex-
plained, for example, that "the IRS is effectively giving a pass to cer-
tain business owners," that large partnerships "essentially shield
partners from challenge by the IRS," that income from such busi-
nesses is "essentially untouchable," and that such businesses are "au-
dit-proof.""117 Following such characterizations in extensive media
coverage, Congress and the President ultimately reformed the part-
nership audit regime to make it more effective. 1 8 Still, such action
occurred only after years of almost no enforcement, and insiders'
awareness of the systematic, virtual lack of enforcement.119 As a re-
sult, the large partnership audit example underscores (1) the possibil-
ity of an accountable response to nonenforcement decisions, (2) the
importance of salience in focusing the politically accountable
branches' and public attention on the nonenforcement, and (3) how
framing nonenforcement as categorical can help make salient what is,
in any event, a very low likelihood of enforcement.
None of this is to say that politically accountable actors will necessa-
rily ignore a nonenforcement problem in the absence of categorical
nonenforcement. Indeed, the new large partnership audit rules dis-
113 Jaime Arora, GAO Calls on IRS to Improve Information for Partnership Audits
(June 13, 2014), 2014 TNT 115-6, June 16, 2014, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysis File).
114 White Statement, note 33, at 2; see also GAO, Large Partnerships, note 35, at 25
(citing focus group reports that complex large partnership structures were being used to
hide income sources and tax shelters).
115 See text accompanying notes 33-37.
116 https://youtu.be/roTrgcD-n9g.
117 Id.
118 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101 (Nov. 2, 2015).
119 See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs
Escape the IRS, 136 Tax Notes 351, 351 (July 22, 2012) (explaining that "interviews with
dozens of practitioners who have direct knowledge of the IRS's large partnership audit
practices" revealed that large partnerships are "effectively immune from audit.").
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cussed above are a useful counterexample to this extreme claim.
Rather, the claim here is a marginal one: Relative to categorical non-
enforcement, setting a low priority is a lower visibility way to hamper
the law on the books.1 20 As a result, by increasing the likelihood that
politically accountable actors (or the staff to which they have dele-
gated responsibility) and the public are aware of important nonen-
forcement decisions while they are happening rather than years later,
categorical nonenforcement may increase the accountability and
therefore the legitimacy of such decisions. 121
Moving to the next theory of agency legitimacy, by increasing the
salience of nonenforcement, categorical nonenforcement may also in-
crease public dialogue about certain nonenforcement decisions. Cate-
gorical nonenforcement can thereby help legitimate the agency's
nonenforcement under the civic republican theory.12 2 Nina Mendel-
son makes a similar point in the context of presidential administra-
tions entrenching policy shortly prior to leaving power.123 She
analyzes one method of entrenching policy that, at first blush, seems
particularly objectionable: Entrenching policy opposed by the Presi-
dent-elect in the form of a binding rule.1 24 This tactic seems particu-
larly objectionable for a number of reasons. First, it seems to
undermine the President-elect's newly electorally granted power to
sway policy in a particular direction and therefore may be a form of
antidemocratic "nose-thumbing" at the public's choice of a new ad-
ministration. 25 Second, since the flurry of entrenched policy by the
outgoing administration occurs at a time when the President faces no
future elections, the new policy may be unaccountable to electoral
checks on political power.' 26
Mendelson, however, explains that, somewhat ironically, the partic-
ularly objectionable nature of entrenchment can also benefit demo-
120 See Amy S. Elliott, Why It Matters That the IRS Has Trouble Auditing Partnerships,
143 Tax Notes 7, 7 (Apr. 7. 2014) ("A problem needs to get very bad before it attracts
congressional attention. That is especially true if some of the people who benefit from the
problem-the investment fund managers who don't have to worry about IRS adjustments
to their partnership items-are some of the biggest campaign contributors for both
parties.").
121 Cf. Andrias, note 104, at 1093 ("By elevating responsibility of enforcement to the
President in ways subject to public evaluation, we can both increase the degree to which
presidential action is likely to track public preferences and the degree to which the public
can understand the exercise of the enforcement power.").
122 In the context mostly of presidential nonenforcement, Sant'Ambrogio explores how
what he calls a presidential extra-legislative veto may play a similar role, explaining that it
can serve a "deliberation forcing and deliberation-enhancing role." Sant'Ambrogio, note
14, at 386.
123 Mendelson, note 65, at 629-30.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 564-65, 604-05, 627.
126 Id. at 566-67.
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cratic governance.1 2 7  The issuance of a rule and the new
administration's attempts to reverse it will be more likely to garner
media coverage as a result of the increased visibility.' 28 The greater
visibility is thereby more likely to spur the involvement of interest
groups and voters, who therefore will engage in a debate and develop
informed policy preferences. 129 The broader dialogue may then yield
a more deliberative agency decision making process, since the agency
will be better informed by public views and public debate.130 In other
words, the very controversial nature of the decision may help garner
the attention necessary to engender dialogue and a deliberative deci-
sion about what otherwise may be an ignored bureaucratic rule.
The analogue found in categorical nonenforcement is that categori-
cal nonenforcement also can serve as a means of highlighting signifi-
cant nonenforcement decisions that otherwise may escape the public's
attention. Categorical nonenforcement may thereby increase the pub-
lic's dialogue and, crucially, the comprehensiveness of the agency's de-
liberation regarding the nonenforcement decision. By facilitating a
more robust public debate, the agency may take into account a wider
array of views and reach a more informed, deliberative decision. 131
Importantly, the seemingly very objectionable nature of categorical
nonenforcement may also be the key to increasing the legitimacy of
the nonenforcement.
On the other hand, categorical nonenforcement is not the prototyp-
ical example of deliberative governance imagined by civic republican-
ism. Civic republicanism imagines deliberative debate that shapes
agency policy ex ante, 132 whereas categorical nonenforcement is an ex
post statement of government policy. Categorical nonenforcement is
also unlikely to be subject to judicial review,133 even though judicial
review can be an important means of ensuring the adequacy of agency
deliberation. 134 Relatedly, a statement of categorical nonenforcement
may, but need not, exhibit the type of reasoned explanation that can
be central to civic republicanism.
127 Id. at 629.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 629-30.
130 Id. at 629.
131 See id. at 630.
132 See Seidenfeld, note 66, at 1529.
133 See text accompanying notes 176-82. However, for reasons discussed elsewhere, see
text accompanying notes 96-100, categorical nonenforcement is more likely than setting a
low priority to gain the attention and feedback of the politically accountable branches.
Political actors also can evaluate outcomes that agencies reach to make sure they are con-
sistent with consensus values. See Seidenfeld, note 66, at 1550-51.
B4 See Seidenfeld, note 66, at 1547.
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However, categorical nonenforcement need not be perfect in order
to promote the legitimacy of agency nonenforcement. By making a
statement of categorical nonenforcement, an agency may widen the
circle of interested parties and counter what is otherwise a tendency
for well-connected parties to dominate. 135 If the categorical nature of
nonenforcement tends to increase the public dialogue regarding im-
portant nonenforcement decisions even after the fact, with such dia-
logue leading to greater deliberation by the agency regarding the
nonenforcement policy and the possibility of changing the policy go-
ing forward, then categorical nonenforcement in some circumstances
may promote the legitimacy of such nonenforcement decisions under
a civic republican theory of agency legitimacy. 136
Categorical nonenforcement also can commit agencies to nonen-
forcement policies that, under certain circumstances, may lead to less
arbitrary and more public-regarding law. One way to commit to a
nonenforcement policy, or to any agency policy, is for the agency to be
legally bound to such a policy. The extent to which an agency would
be legally bound to a policy of nonenforcement depends on how such
policy is characterized under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 137 To briefly summarize the possibilities, if the policy of non-
enforcement is characterized as a legislative rule, the agency will be
legally bound to the rule until the agency uses notice and comment to
change the rule. 138 On the other hand, if the policy of nonenforce-
ment is characterized as either a mere policy statement ("policy state-
ment") or an interpretation of the statute ("interpretive rule"), the
agency is unlikely to be legally bound to the nonenforcement pol-
icy,139 meaning that the agency can simply fail to abide by the nonen-
135 See, e.g., Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and En-
hancing Participation, 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 517, 524 (2012) (explaining the tendency of well-
connected parties to prevail in the context of IRS guidance).
136 See Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 695, 735
(2007) ("[1]ncreased public participation in agency decisionmaking is more democratic and
increases the legitimacy of agency decisions and public trust in the agencies."); Mendelson,
note 65, at 636 (explaining that "a visible public debate more likely would engage less
organized segments of the public as well and help assure the agency's fuller consideration
of both the diversity of public views and their intensity").
137 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2012).
138 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012); See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin.,
995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that in order for a legislative rule to be
amended, the agency must comply with the Act's notice and comment provision).
139 With respect to policy statements, see, for example, Graham v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d
931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (suggesting agencies cannot bind themselves to rules that would
undermine a comprehensive statutory scheme); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that a policy statement is necessarily a
tentative expression of how an agency intends to exercise its power, and therefore, cannot
be legally binding). With respect to interpretive rules, see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
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forcement policy or change it informally, although there are some
arguments to the contrary.140
While distinguishing between interpretive rules, legislative rules,
and policy statements is a notoriously difficult task,' 41 if an agency's
statement of nonenforcement indicates how the agency has exercised
its discretionary enforcement (or in this case nonenforcement) author-
ity, and this statement cannot reasonably be seen as the agency's inter-
pretation of an ambiguous statute or an attempt to bind the public,
then such statement may be a policy statement, rather than an inter-
pretive or legislative rule.142 On the other hand, some courts may
conclude that, even if not binding on the public, a nonenforcement
policy should be treated by the agency as a legislative rule if the rule
eliminates the agency's own enforcement discretion.' 43 In any event,
without engaging in a full-blown analysis, at least some courts would
conclude that at least some nonenforcement policies are mere policy
statements. As a result, at least as to these nonenforcement policies,
the statements of nonenforcement may not actually bind the agency to
nonenforcement as a legal matter.
Even assuming, however, that all the statements of nonenforcement
discussed in this Article are mere policy statements, which are not le-
140 See, e.g., Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 208 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd en banc on
other grounds, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) ("[E]stablished policies of
an administrative agency may provide the law by which to judge an administrative action
or inaction .... "); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Before the [Bureau
of Indian Affairs] may extinguish the entitlement of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries,
it must comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures."). Later authority has
undermined the rule described in Morton v. Ruiz. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S.
785, 789 (1981) (explaining that the Social Security Administration (SSA) Claims Manual
does not bind the SSA). Then again, an agency may have some due process obligation to
provide notice and a reasoned explanation for deviation from its policy, although this is far
from clear if the policy conflicts with the statute. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in
the Rulemaking Spectrum, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 844-45 (2001) (fleshing out possibilities
of action an agency may have to take with regard to deviations from its internal policies).
141 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)
("The distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy statements has
been described at various times as 'tenuous,' 'fuzzy,' 'blurred,' and, perhaps most pictur-
esquely, 'enshrouded in considerable smog."').
142 See Conn. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 9
F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that a "new program instruction" is likely a policy
statement, because it essentially sets forth enforcement criteria, rather than defining a stat-
utory term); Tom C. Clark, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947) (explaining that policy statements set forth "the
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power"); Daniel T. Shedd
& Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., R43710, A Primer on the Reviewability of Agency
Delay and Enforcement Discretion 10 (2014) ("Because an agency's decision to enforce a
statute in a given situation is discretionary, an agency's announcement of its enforcement
policy would appear to qualify as a guidance document .... ").
143 See Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537-38 (1985) (examining
the agency's use of language to determine the possibility of an agency binding itself).
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gaily binding, such statements of nonenforcement can still serve as a
practical means of committing the agency to the nonenforcement.
From an internal perspective, by making an official statement of cate-
gorical nonenforcement, high-level officials can communicate the non-
enforcement policy to lower-level officials to assure they act in
accordance with the nonenforcement policy. 144 From an external per-
spective, even though the agency legally may be able to renege on its
nonenforcement promise to regulated parties, doing so would subject
the agency to significant ire, and therefore serves as a practical com-
mitment mechanism for the agency. As a result, even if not legally
enforceable, the nonenforcement promise can serve as an internal and
external means of assuring nonenforcement, at least until the promise
lapses or is publicly changed.1 45
Internal and external commitments to nonenforcement can pro-
mote nonarbitrariness for a number of reasons. First, in deciding to
commit to nonenforcement, rather than simply relying on ad hoc deci-
sionmaking, high-level agency officials have to think through the con-
tours of the policy, a process that can help ensure that the
nonenforcement that does occur can be systemically justified.146 Sec-
ond, when enforcement in a particular area does not make sense, cate-
gorical nonenforcement can serve as an essential means of controlling
lower-level officials and aligning their nonenforcement with the pub-
lic-regarding policy. 147 As Friendly poignantly explained, the "defini-
tion of standards is required if the agency members are to be the
masters of the staff rather than the slaves of anonymous Neros, each
fiddling his own tune. ' ' 148 Perhaps most importantly, when high-level
officials have determined that enforcement does not make sense in a
particular area, categorical nonenforcement can prevent individual
agents from using enforcement as a tool to harass disfavored par-
144 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke
L.J. 1311, 1364 (1992) ("Staff members acting upon matters to which the guidance docu-
ments pertain will routinely and indeed automatically apply those documents, rather than
considering their policy afresh before deciding whether to apply them."); Nina A. Mendel-
son, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 397,
409 (2007); Metzger, note 14, at 1873.
145 See, e.g., Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 839-40 (discussing the IRS's longstanding his-
tory of not abandoning well-established customary deviations); see also Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 863 (2009) (describing how, even
when agency decisions limiting discretion do not legally bind the agency, they may create
"expectations and reliance that translate into meaningful pressure for the agency in the
future"); Mendelson, note 144, at 401 (explaining that "despite the lack of formal legal
binding effect, agencies increasingly state that they will endeavor to follow guidance docu-
ment policies").
146 See Magill, note 145, at 887.
147 See id. at 884-86.
148 Friendly, note 90, at 24; Metzger, note 14, at 1896-97.
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ties. 149 For these reasons, a number of scholars have argued that it
makes sense to encourage agencies to promulgate centralized gui-
dance about the law, thereby facilitating equal treatment, rather than
forcing agencies to rely upon the discretion of individual agents, and
the accompanying creation of a "secret law. ' 150
Of course, an agency could commit to a categorical nonenforcement
policy that is not public-regarding. Nonenforcement, like many
agency decisions, can serve as a means of "giving rents to private par-
ties, ' 151 and nonenforcement may actually be a particularly dangerous
form of rent-giving, because simply not enforcing may be more likely
to escape public review than an agency actively providing resources or
beneficial regulation to a regulated party. While the close working
relationship between the IRS, Treasury, and congressional tax com-
mittees, and the close scrutiny of these government actors by an active
tax press and an extensive tax bar, in some circumstances may help
ensure public-regarding decisions, this is not necessarily the case.
Like other agencies, the IRS may be particularly swayed by powerful
interest groups, groups that will tend to have particular influence on
the government actors.1 52 Viewed from this perspective, an agency
promising permanent (or semi-permanent) nonenforcement could
promote particularly insidious agency giveaways. However, systemat-
ically setting a low enforcement priority, which essentially shields a
sector of taxpayers from enforcement, can also serve as a form of rent-
giving, and would be more likely than categorical nonenforcement to
evade review, thereby making the private giveaway less transparent.
As a result, while categorical nonenforcement certainly could serve as
a particularly strong commitment to a non-public-regarding nonen-
forcement policy, because of its salience the very categorical nature of
categorical nonenforcement may actually reduce this danger.
An example from the tax context helps illustrate how categorical
nonenforcement may be useful to an agency as a means of regular-
izing its discretion and producing nonarbitrary enforcement. The ex-
149 See Bressman, note 67, at 1691.
150 See, e.g., Metzger, note 14, at 1919-20 (arguing that "courts should give agencies
more leeway to issue informal guidance without running afoul of the APA's notice and
comment requirements, on the grounds that such guidance is a crucial part of agency ef-
forts to fulfill their internal oversight responsibilities and curtail lower-level discretion");
Strauss, note 140, at 808 ("Agency administration is aided when central officials can advise
responsible bureaucrats how they should apply agency law. Citizens are better off if they
can know about these instructions and rely on agency positions, with the assurance of equal
treatment such central advice permits, than if they are remitted to the discretion of local
agents and to 'secret law."').
151 Magill, note 145, at 901 ("[P]romises of nonenforcement-to segments of an industry
would be an excellent way for an agency to provide rents to private parties.").
152 See Book, note 135, at 524 (describing the phenomenon).
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ample comes from deep inside partnership tax, an extremely complex
area of the Code, which is quite difficult for many tax practitioners,
much less the average congressperson, to understand. 53 A perennial
problem for partnership taxation is the taxation of a partnership inter-
est received in exchange for the provision of services. 154 The problem
reared its head in the early 1970's, when the Tax Court, in a case
called Diamond v. Commissioner, determined that the receipt of a so-
called profits interest (which is an interest in future profits) in ex-
change for the provision of services is includible in income at its fair
market value at the time of the receipt by the service partner. 155
Commentators reacted fiercely to the decision, criticizing it as
presenting great administrative difficulties. 156 The IRS Office of
Chief Counsel agreed and advised the Assistant Commissioner (Tech-
nical) of the IRS to issue a revenue ruling indicating that, despite the
Diamond case, the IRS would not attempt to include in income the
receipt of a mere profits interest as compensation for services.' 57 Had
the IRS released the ruling, it would have been forgoing enforcement
that was at least arguably allowed under the relevant tax law at the
time, as a result of the Tax Court's decision in Diamond. Rather than
release the ruling, the IRS attempted to unofficially steer agents away
from raising the issue.158 This left advisors with the sense that nonen-
forcement was the IRS's position, but without any assurances that the
IRS was bound to it.159
153 See, e.g., Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations-Idiot-Proof or
Drafting for Idiots?, 35 Real Est. Tax'n 116, 116 (2008) (describing that "[p]artnership
taxation is an adventure in Wonderland ....").
154 See Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47
Tax. L. Rev. 247, 247 (1991) (describing "[t]he taxation of a partnership interest issued in
exchange for services," as "one of the most troublesome issues of partnership tax law").
Additionally, a plethora of articles have been written on the subject. See, e.g., Martin B.
Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: The
Diamond Case, 27 Tax L. Rev. 161 (1972); Carolyn S. Nachmias, Using Profits to Compen-
sate a Service Provider-Potential Partnership Characterization, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1125
(1994); Leo L. Schmolka, Commentary, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Ser-
vices: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 Tax L. Rev. 287 (1992).
155 Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530, 545-48 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
1974).
156 See, e.g., Arthur B. Willis, Partnership Taxation § 11.04 (2d ed. 1976).
157 G.C.M. 36,346 (July 25, 1977). In the most relevant part, the proposed ruling stated
"[the Internal Revenue Service will not follow the decision in Sol Diamond to the extent
that it holds that the receipt by a partner of an interest in future partnership profits as
compensation for services results in taxable income." Id.
158 William S. McKee, William F. Nelson, Robert L. Whitmire, Gary R. Huffman &
James P. Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships & Partners 5.02[3] (3d ed. 2005).
159 See id. (describing a two decades "truce," with no enforcement actions by the IRS,
following the Diamond decision); see also John A. Townsend, The Controversy over
Campbell: Slicing the Bologna Too Thin, 52 Tax Notes 83 (July 1, 1991).
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This informal nonenforcement policy worked fairly well for some
time, but ultimately the lack of an official policy of nonenforcement
meant that individual IRS field agents could wreak havoc for taxpay-
ers and the IRS alike by raising the issue on their own accord. Follow-
ing the Diamond case, the IRS rarely pressed the issue, and, as a
result, for almost two decades few cases addressed the question. 160 As
a result of a lack of official IRS policy against enforcement, however,
an IRS field agent ultimately asserted that the receipt of profits inter-
ests as compensation for services should be included in the income of
a married couple in Arkansas. 161 Rumors indicated that the field
agent's pursuit of the case occurred without the approval of the IRS's
national office, and that had such approval been sought, the national
office may have buried the case, indicating how the individual field
agent's decision did not accord with a high-level, systematic assess-
ment.162 Indeed, to add insult to injury, the IRS agent not only as-
serted that receipt of the profits interest should be included in income
but also asserted that a negligence penalty should be imposed on the
taxpayers for failing to include the receipt of such profits interest in
income. 163 The notion that an individual taxpayer could not only be
subject to enforcement of a tax law that high-level officials had deter-
mined did not make sense systematically, but also affirmatively be pe-
nalized for failure to abide by a policy that had been rejected at high
levels underscored how the lack of an official policy could result in
unjustifiable unfairness in particular cases.
The IRS agent's assertion was contested by the surprised taxpay-
ers,164 forcing the IRS into court in order to defend the inclusion in
income. At the Eighth Circuit, the IRS tried to concede the issue in
the case (while still preserving the tax result in the case at issue on
other grounds) without actually creating a precedent regarding the
taxability of profits interests for taxpayers to rely upon to plan their
affairs accordingly. 165 The Eighth Circuit found in favor of the tax-
payers in the case, but did not ultimately resolve the general question
160 Cunningham, note 154, at 250-51.
161 Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 237-47 (1996), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
162 See Townsend, note 159, at 91 n.43.
163 Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 237.
164 The taxpayer in the case had consulted with several tax attorneys about the matter,
including a tax attorney who taught partnership tax at New York University School of Law.
Id. That attorney informed the taxpayers that, despite Diamond, he should not be taxed,
indicating that "there was little or no chance that he would be taxed on the receipt of such
interests ...." Id.
165 Campbell, 943 F.2d at 818.
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of whether the receipt of profits interests in exchange for the provi-
sion of services to a partnership should be included in income1 66
In light of the controversy and the remaining uncertainty, the IRS
finally stepped in after the Eighth's Circuit decision to issue a state-
ment of nonenforcement. It did so in the form of Revenue Procedure
93-27.167 According to the IRS, revenue procedures are publicly pub-
lished "statements of practice and procedure issued primarily for in-
ternal use."'1 68 Revenue Procedure 93-27 begins by summarizing the
background of the controversy and the uncertainty it had engendered
and then states that, unless certain clearly delineated exceptions ap-
ply, "if a person receives a profits interest for the provision of services
... the Internal Revenue Service will not treat the receipt of such an
interest as a taxable event for the partner or the partnership.' '169 In
other words, regardless of whether or not the IRS could do so, it was
promising that it would not enforce the inclusion in income of profits
interests received in exchange for services provided to a partnership,
unless certain exceptions applied. The language of this statement of
nonenforcement is remarkably similar to the IRS's announcement
about frequent flyer miles: "the IRS will not assert that any taxpayer
has understated his federal tax liability by reason of the receipt or
personal use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind promotional ben-
efits attributable to the taxpayer's business or official travel.' 170
While the IRS has more recently suggested that it will pursue a differ-
ent set of legal rules in the context of partnership profit interests in
166 Id. at 818-23.
167 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
168 Rev. Proc. 55-1, 1995-2 C.B. 897.
169 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. The exceptions are that the revenue procedure
will not apply:
(1) If the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and predictable
stream of income from partnership assets, such as income from high-quality
debt securities or a high-quality net lease;
(2) If within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the profits interest; or
(3) If the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a "publicly traded
partnership" within the meaning of section 7704(b) of the Code.
Id.
170 Announcement 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 621. The fact that the IRS would have faced a
significant uphill battle for inclusion on legal grounds in Revenue Procedure 93-27 sup-
ports the contention of Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein that such statements of "non-
enforcement" may be viewed just as easily, or perhaps better, as interpretations of the law.
See Abreu & Greenstein, note 42, at 54-55. This conclusion, however, depends on how
strong the law underlying the IRS's concession is, and the characterization as an interpreta-
tion therefore seems stronger in the case of Revenue Procedure 93-27 than in the case of
Announcement 2002-18. As discussed previously, whether the IRS is promising nonen-
forcement because of its doubts about the law or because of administrative or other
noninterpretive reasons, this Article generally views together the IRS discretionary state-
ments with respect to enforcement of the law.
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the form of regulations, 171 for over a decade Revenue Procedure 93-
27 served as a source of certainty and uniformity. The proposed regu-
lations, if finalized, would offer their own resolution of the issues and
presentation of new issues.172
The saga regarding taxation of profits interests is instructive regard-
ing the potential benefits of an agency committing to a policy of non-
enforcement through categorical nonenforcement. By failing to
commit to a policy of nonenforcement after Diamond, the IRS
opened the door for arbitrary administrative action. Having an unof-
ficial, not transparent, policy of nonenforcement left taxpayers uncer-
tain about how to plan their affairs. Rather than being able to rely on
a consistent policy determined for all taxpayers, individual taxpayers
became vulnerable to the possibility of enforcement by lone revenue
agents, motivated by their own, unsystematic sense of their enforce-
ment duties. 173 As described by a leading treatise, between Diamond
and Campbell "millions of service-connected transfers of partnership
profits interests went unchallenged, while only a few unfortunates
found themselves dealing with the effects of Diamond. ' 174 The idea
of being one of the only taxpayers subject to enforcement for a partic-
ular issue, when high-level officials have unofficially precluded such
enforcement as a result of concerns about administrability and/or
other misgivings is a quintessential example of arbitrary agency action.
This possibility also leads to the insidious threat of individual revenue
agents using enforcement action, which is not in accordance with high-
level policy, as a tool to harass individual taxpayers based on charac-
teristics that the revenue agents dislike. Had the IRS issued a state-
ment of categorical nonenforcement after Diamond, it could have
committed to less arbitrary and more public-regarding policy, increas-
ing the legitimacy of its nonenforcement.
In sum, viewing the realities of agency nonenforcement of the tax
law through the lens of agency legitimacy shows how categorical non-
enforcement, in certain circumstances, may actually increase the legit-
imacy of agency nonenforcement. Prior to leaving this lens of agency
legitimacy, it is useful to address a number of lingering issues. First,
would categorical nonenforcement withstand judicial review, should
171 See Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1); see also Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(1)(1) (applying § 83 to
receipt of profits interest but providing elective safe harbor of liquidation value for part-
nership interest received in exchange for services).
172 See id. For discussion of the proposed regulations, see McKee et al., note 158,
5.02[8].
173 Cf. Mendelson, note 144, at 413 (explaining that guidance documents "enable agen-
cies to manage their numerous employees who have contact with the public, reducing the
risk of arbitrary decisions and increasing the chances that individual agency employees will
treat like cases alike").
174 McKee et al., note 158, 5.02[3].
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it, and what, if anything, do these conclusions reveal about the legiti-
macy of categorical nonenforcement? To some, the lack of discussion
of judicial review thus far might be striking. Judicial review is often
discussed as an independent means of securing agency legitimacy, or
as a means of promoting the theories of agency legitimacy discussed
above.1 75
Judicial review has not been discussed thus far, or set forth as an
independent theory of agency legitimacy, because of practical con-
straints on judicial review of nonenforcement. As a general matter,
and in the tax context in particular, a combination of restrictive stand-
ing doctrine and a general presumption against reviewability of
agency nonenforcement decisions serves as a barrier to judicial review
of agency nonenforcement. 176 As for standing, potential litigants do
not have standing to challenge the tax liability (or nonenforcement of
the tax liability) of others, 177 and taxpayers generally will not have an
incentive to challenge nonenforcement of their own tax liability, 178 a
set of circumstances that mirrors more generally the difficulty that
regulatory beneficiaries face in challenging agency nonenforce-
ment.179 As for nonreviewability, the Supreme Court in Heckler v.
Chaney'80 declared a general presumption against review of agency
nonenforcement decisions, in part because an "agency decision not to
enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors
which are peculiarly within its expertise," and outside of a court's area
of expertise.1 81 Indeed, while the case is very much a live issue cur-
rently, even a recent Fifth Circuit opinion denying the stay of the in-
junction of DAPA underscored that ordinarily standing and
nonreviewability serve as barriers to challenging nonenforcement pol-
175 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1383, 1413 (2004) ("The dominant narrative of modern administrative law casts
judges as key players who help tame, and thereby legitimate, the exercise of administrative
power.").
176 See Bressman, note 67, at 1675; see also Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 848-50.
177 Justice Stewart famously indicated that he could not "imagine a case, at least outside
the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever
could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else." Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). For a foundational
case, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984).
178 Cf. Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 848-50 (coming up with a very particularized exam-
ple in which taxpayer subject to nonenforcement might challenge it but concluding that
"[d]espite the theoretical possibility that a taxpayer could have motivation-and stand-
ing-to challenge the application to himself of a taxpayer-favorable customary deviation,
in practice such litigation is vanishingly rare").
179 Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 186-88, 195-96 (1992) (discussing how standing and the
nonreviewability doctrine disadvantage regulatory beneficiaries).
180 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
181 Id. at 831.
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icies. 182  Specifically, in finding that standing existed and
nonreviewability was not a bar, the Fifth Circuit was very careful to
repeatedly emphasize that "DAPA's version of deferred action, how-
ever, is more than nonenforcement: It is the affirmative act of confer-
ring 'lawful presence' on a class of unlawfully present aliens,"
triggering "eligibility for federal and state benefits that would not oth-
erwise be available. 18 3 As a result, at least for now, the traditional
bars of standing and nonreviewability apply for pure nonenforcement
policies. Therefore, while judicial review may play an important role
in legitimating many agency decisions, it generally does not serve as
an effective means of legitimating agency nonenforcement
decisions.' 84
Notwithstanding these practical difficulties, some may point to hints
in a number of cases that categorical nonenforcement may be particu-
larly problematic, and therefore may, at least in the right case, be able
to overcome the presumption against reviewability of agency nonen-
forcement (although, unless standing doctrine changes, in most cases
review would still be barred by standing doctrine). In Chaney, in ex-
plaining why the presumption against judicial review made sense, the
Supreme Court stated that the agency was better equipped to deter-
mine the "proper ordering of its priorities,"' 185 and indicated in a foot-
note that the Court was not deciding a case where it could "justifiably
be found that the agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a
general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities."' 186 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'ns
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,187 albeit a case that
dealt with regulation rather than nonenforcement, Justice Rehnquist
indicated in his concurring opinion that, while an agency may "evalu-
ate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration," it could
"not refuse to enforce laws of which it does not approve, or to ignore
182 Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
183 Id. at 757; see also id. at 757 n.65 ("The Cole Memo does not direct an agency to
grant any type of affirmative benefit to anyone engaged in unlawful conduct, whereas the
DAPA Memo directs an agency to grant lawful presence and provides eligibility for em-
ployment authorization and other federal and state benefits to certain illegally present
aliens."); id. at 765 n.112 ("Because DAPA is much more than a nonenforcement policy,
which is presumptively committed to agency discretion .. requiring it to go through notice
and comment does not mean that a traditional nonenforcement policy would also be sub-
ject to those requirements, assuming that a party even had standing to challenge it.").
184 It is outside the scope of this Article to critique this result. Others have done so well
in other work. See, e.g., Bressman, note 176, at 1675. Here, it is enough to say that the
inability to challenge nonenforcement decisions is problematic, but also reflects the real
difficulties courts would have in judging nonenforcement.
185 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
186 Id. at 833 n.4.
187 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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statutory standards .... ,,18 8 Other cases have provided similar hints,
though certainly not controlling law, that complete failure to enforce
the law may not be permissible.' 8 9
The analysis above, however, does not provide a clear-cut case
against categorical nonenforcement. For reasons discussed above, and
in further detail below, in many cases setting a low priority can have a
very similar effect to categorical nonenforcement. In light of this real-
ity, perhaps setting a low priority, in appropriate cases, should not be
treated differently than categorical nonenforcement. Moreover, it is
not clear whether categorical nonenforcement always should be seen
as "so extreme as to amount to an abdication of [the agency's] statu-
tory responsibilities,"' 90 rather than a reasonable decision of the
agency, in light of the various considerations it is balancing in a partic-
ular case. Categorical, in other words, is not necessarily the same as
"so extreme as to amount to an abdication, '" 191 and this Article funda-
mentally posits that they should not be treated synonymously.
Indeed, the limited judicial authority regarding nonenforcement
may speak more to the extensiveness of nonenforcement than to the
categorical nature of nonenforcement. In Chaney, in suggesting that
judicial review might be available where there has been an abdication
of statutory responsibilities, the Supreme Court looked to a case in
which the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW")
had engaged in extensive nonenforcement of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and had claimed that HEW's enforcement of Title
VI was completely discretionary.' 92 Even though HEW actually had
not promised categorical nonenforcement of any specific aspect of Ti-
tle VI, its claim nonetheless was notable presumably because of how
sweeping the potential nonenforcement could be. In another context,
Justice Scalia implied that agency discretion may be more acceptable
for narrow questions, rather than substantial decisions. 193 In Allison
v. Block, in concluding that the Secretary of Agriculture could not
abdicate responsibility to implement an entire statutory program, the
188 Id. at 59 n.* (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
189 See, e.g., Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631, 638 (8th Cir. 1983); Texas v. United States,
86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 636-43 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (suggesting that DAPA and expansion of
DACA may be an example of abdication).
190 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 833, 839, 850 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
193 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) ("While Congress
need not provide any direction to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define
'country elevators,' which are to be exempt from new-stationary-source regulations gov-
erning grain elevators, see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(i), it must provide substantial guidance on
setting air standards that affect the entire national economy.").
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Eighth Circuit suggested that it was the extensiveness of the nonen-
forcement that was particularly problematic.' 94
In any event, while reasonable minds certainly may differ on how
Chaney should be read, this Article does not adopt the perspective
that even particularly extensive categorical nonenforcement should
necessarily be impermissible. For instance, rather than being seen as
simply a problem from the perspective of judicial review, categorical
nonenforcement perhaps should be viewed as a benefit. By being
transparent about nonenforcement, categorical nonenforcement may
help facilitate judicial review of the appropriateness of the nonen-
forcement, 195 and thereby help legitimate it. How and when a court
would or should actually strike down a categorical nonenforcement
policy, in light of the difficult decisions that must be made in making
enforcement decisions (which courts are arguably particularly ill-
suited to judge), remains quite unclear. But by transparently commu-
nicating nonenforcement, categorical nonenforcement could at least
offer courts the ability to judge when such decisions are being made in
a reasonable fashion, or consistently with what Congress would have
wanted had it examined the difficult question, or in accordance with
whatever other inquiry courts decide is relevant. 196 In sum, while the
combination of standing and nonreviewability generally will prevent
judicial review of pure nonenforcement policies, this Article implicitly
posits that judicial review should not single out categorical nonen-
forcement as impermissible. Moreover, the very lack of judicial re-
view of agency nonenforcement makes the theories of agency
legitimacy discussed above all the more important. 97
Finally, it is also worth making explicit something that was implicit
in the discussion of the theories of agency legitimacy. Categorical
194 Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing cases in which
nonenforcement of entire program was not at issue). The recent OLC opinion regarding
the Department of Homeland Security's discretion to enforce immigration laws was also
sensitive to this question of whether extensiveness of nonenforcement affects its legality.
OLC Opinion, note 21, at 30-31; see also Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 654
(S.D., Tex. 2015) (emphasizing the "wide-reaching" nature of DAPA and the expansion of
DACA in deciding that Chaney did not bar judicial review of these immigration nonen-
forcement initiatives). As mentioned previously, on review, the Fifth Circuit emphasized
principally that DAPA was not a mere nonenforcement policy, but rather also an affirma-
tive act of conferring lawful presence and eligibility for associated benefits. See text ac-
companying note 183.
195 See Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pefia, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing
Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) ("[A]n agency's statement of a
general enforcement policy may be reviewable for legal sufficiency where the agency has...
articulated it in some form of universal policy statement.") (emphasis in original).
196 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
197 Cf. Metzger, note 14, at 1895 (stressing that internal supervision becomes even more
important as a means of "guarding against arbitrary use of governmental power... when
judicial review is lacking").
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nonenforcement may work differently in different situations, and
thereby may increase accountability, deliberation, or nonarbitrariness,
without necessarily increasing all three. For instance, in a situation in
which the agency nonenforcement deals with a question, such as a rel-
atively obscure partnership tax question, that would be perceived as
technical, categorical nonenforcement may be unlikely to increase
widespread accountability and deliberation (at least by the public at
large). Nonetheless, categorical nonenforcement may still increase
nonarbitrariness, and therefore increase the legitimacy of the nonen-
forcement. Similarly, one could subscribe to a particular theory of
agency legitimacy and reject the others, and categorical nonenforce-
ment could still increase the legitimacy of nonenforcement, to the ex-
tent that it increases legitimacy under the relevant theory of agency
legitimacy. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that conceptions of
the administrative state have tended to swing back and forth between
two poles over time: one that emphasizes that agencies are engaging
in political, policymaking decisions, 198 and the other that emphasizes
that agencies are engaging in decisions that rely on technical exper-
tise. 199 The first pole will tend to look to some form of political ac-
countability theory to legitimate agency action, whereas the second
will tend to look to some form of nonarbitrariness theory. An under-
lying assumption of this Article is that agencies do not engage in just
one type of decisionmaking, but rather do a mix of both. For instance,
the IRS may make policy-laden decisions about whether to pursue
business taxes aggressively or not, as well as expertise-laden decisions
about whether administrative concerns preclude enforcement of a
very technical tax provision. A comprehensive evaluation of execu-
tive nonenforcement should take into account the different types of
decisions that agencies make, as fleshed out in the examples above,
and how categorical nonenforcement can impact such decisions, and,
in some circumstances, increase the accountability, deliberation, and/
or nonarbitrariness of agency nonenforcement.
V. AIuTIERNATrlVE, LENSES
Having examined the case for categorical nonenforcement through
the lens of agency legitimacy, it is useful to return to the alternative
lenses of constitutional law and rule of law that other scholars have
198 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, note 70, at 97-101 (describing "large-scale shifts in the
nature of our understanding of what the administrators' power is" and characterizing the
then-predominant view of agencies engaging in political, policy-laden decisions).
199 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 88 (describing recent pendulum swing back to concern for
agency expertise).
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 69:112 TAX LAW REVIEW
2015] THE CASE FOR CATEGORICAL NONENFORCEMENT 113
used in examining nonenforcement generally and tax law nonenforce-
ment specifically. As discussed below, in delineating what is accept-
able executive nonenforcement, both the existing constitutional and
rule of law lenses rely on formal distinctions, such as distinctions be-
tween categorical nonenforcement and setting priorities, or between
nonenforcement motivated by limitations on enforcement resources
and nonenforcement motivated by policy, that do not hold up well
against the realities of agency nonenforcement. Especially in light of
such limitations, the agency legitimacy lens has much to offer to the
ongoing contemplation of executive nonenforcement.
To begin, the distinctions that constitutional law scholars have tried
to draw between categorical nonenforcement and setting priorities
may be more illusory than real.200 To take an example from the tax
context, as described previously, the IRS has been engaging in seem-
ingly impotent enforcement of the Code for large partnerships. 20'
While this result has occurred under the formal guise of setting priori-
ties rather than categorical nonenforcement, 20 2 the notion that virtu-
ally impotent audit is clearly distinct from categorical nonenforcement
just because it technically occurs through setting a low enforcement
priority is untenable. Indeed, Tax Analysts' ability to frame such non-
enforcement as essentially categorical underscores the lack of a clear
distinction from setting priorities.20 3 While other instances of tax law
nonenforcement have not received as much recent attention as the
large partnership example (and, to a lesser degree, the frequent flier
miles example), the same point could be made with respect to many
other aspects of the tax law that go essentially unenforced. For in-
stance, in 2009 the (then) IRS Commissioner explained, "The current
law [regarding inclusion in income of personal use of an employer-
provided cellphone], which has been on the books for many years, is
burdensome, poorly understood by taxpayers, and difficult for
the IRS to administer consistently. The passage of time, advances in
technology, and the nature of communication in the modern work-
place have rendered this law obsolete." 204 While the Commissioner's
statement certainly falls short of a statement of categorical nonen-
forcement (and while the IRS in fact had tried to enforce the law in
200 Indeed, even some proponents of the line have acknowledged its difficulties. See,
e.g., Price, note 2, at 677 ("[T]he line between a priority and a policy will be unclear in
many cases.").
201 See text accompanying notes 37-39.
202 For a discussion of how failure to reallocate resources to partnerships has in part led
to the current state of affairs with partnership audits, see Brock, note 36, at 55-60.
203 See text accompanying notes 116-17.
204 Stephen Ohlemacher, IRS, Treasury Want Cellphone Tax Repealed, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.comlmoney/workplace/2009-06-16-cell-phoneN.htm (June 16, 2009).
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certain high profile cases205), to the extent that the IRS has aban-
doned enforcement in almost all cases, and taxpayers have essentially
abandoned reporting of income, the distinction between categorical
nonenforcement and setting priorities becomes somewhat meaning-
less. Indeed, in reporting on the Commissioner's statements, one
newspaper described the requirement to include in income personal
use of an employer-provided cellphone as "[a] widely ignored law,"
which the "IRS thinks [is] a stupid law, too. 206
Moreover, for reasons described in Part III, impotent enforcement
of at least some aspects of the tax law at least some of the time is an
inevitable part of modern tax administration. From a practical per-
spective, therefore, the IRS cannot avoid setting low priorities, nor
would it make sense to attempt to force the IRS to do so. Accepting
low priorities as inevitable, and often virtually indistinguishable from
categorical nonenforcement, suggests the disutility of singling out cat-
egorical nonenforcement as impermissible.
While not the focus of this Article, the high-profile cases that consti-
tutional scholars have themselves been sparring over illustrate this
point as well. Referring to DACA, Robert Delahunty and John Yoo
have characterized the program as a "decision not to enforce the re-
moval provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
against an estimated population of 800,000 to 1.76 million individuals
illegally present in the United States, ' 20 7 or, in other words, a case of
categorical nonenforcement, and Zachary Price has seconded that
"this policy amounts to a categorical, prospective suspension of [the
law]. '208 In contrast, as previously alluded to, the Obama Administra-
tion actually took pains to indicate that it was merely setting priorities
and even that particular decisions would be made on a "case by case"
basis.20 9 Other scholars and commentators have argued that President
Obama's immigration actions, far from categorical nonenforcement,
are merely setting enforcement priorities, which they describe as a
quintessentially executive role.210 The differing characterizations by
different people looking at the exact same policy shines light on how
the distinction itself at the very least does not lead to self-evident or
particularly satisfying conclusions.
On the one hand, a statement that reserves the right to deport par-
ticular individuals if circumstances merit the deportation, despite a
general policy against it, is for all intents and purposes the same as a
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Delahunty & Yoo, note 2, at 783.
208 Price, note 2, at 760.
209 See text accompanying notes 17-19.
210 See note 14.
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policy of categorical nonenforcement if such right is never, or even
virtually never, exercised. Even to the extent that such right is exer-
cised in an exceptional case, for the millions of individuals who will
not be deported and gain the virtual assurance of nondeportation, a
policy that formally sets priorities and leaves some technical space for
case-by-case deviations nonetheless provides assurance almost identi-
cal to that provided by categorical nonenforcement. 211 To elevate the
very unlikely possibility that the executive will deviate from a policy
of nonenforcement to a saving grace from a constitutional perspective
pushes form over function to an unreasonable degree.
On the other hand, if we reasonably reject the terms of the policy as
a means of distinguishing between categorical nonenforcement and
setting priorities, the distinction itself becomes somewhat meaning-
less. If DACA, which was explicitly formulated as an exercise in set-
ting priorities, should be considered for all intents and purposes an
instance of categorical nonenforcement, then any supposed exercise in
setting priorities may really be categorical nonenforcement. The task,
then, of distinguishing between a policy of setting priorities and a
policy of categorical nonenforcement will be factually intensive and
almost certain not to produce intellectual coherence or clearly impor-
tant values.
At least some constitutional law scholars might counter that, none-
theless, a distinction must be drawn between nonenforcement (even
categorical nonenforcement) that is motivated by enforcement re-
source limitations (which may be an acceptable exercise of executive
power) and nonenforcement that is motivated by policy (which may
not be an acceptable exercise of executive power). However, the no-
tion that there is such a clear divide is also untenable. 212 When deal-
ing with an agency that is perpetually underfunded, there often will be
some sort of enforcement resource limitation that could explain why
an agency has chosen not to enforce a particular aspect of the law.
Indeed, in a resources-strapped agency, any instance of nonenforce-
ment could be explained, at least in part, by enforcement limita-
tions.21 3 However, various policy decisions are often going to be
211 See Obama, note 19 (explaining that, through DACA, "DHS is lifting the shadow of
deportation from these young people").
212 Even strong proponents of such a divide acknowledge the real difficulties. See, e.g.,
Love & Garg, note 15, at 1225 ("Resource constraints are ubiquitous, presidents are in the
business of making decisions that serve their predetermined policy goals, and priorities and
obligations will often conflict."); id. at 1229 (noting that courts might be unwilling or inca-
pable of policing this divide).
213 Of course, it might be possible to find an example of an agency that is not resource-
strapped, and in such cases the enforcement limitations explanation might be less plausible.
See id. at 1218-20 (making such an argument with respect to the Bush administration's
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intermixed with enforcement considerations, making it difficult to dis-
entangle them.
For example, the decision to engage in categorical nonenforcement
with respect to frequent flier miles earned on business trips paid for
by the taxpayer's employer but used for personal purposes can be ex-
plained in part by the difficulty for the IRS in enforcing the inclusion
of such miles in income.214 The IRS's statement of nonenforcement
with respect to frequent flier miles specifically indicates that the IRS
had not "pursued a tax enforcement program with respect to promo-
tional benefits such as frequent flyer miles" as a result of "unresolved
issues" which are "technical and administrative" in nature.215 Princi-
pally, IRS attempts to value the miles for each taxpayer may engender
a nightmarish valuation hassle.216 This valuation hassle would not
prevent the IRS from enforcing the law. However, it may very well
force the IRS to engage in a very resource-intensive valuation battle
with taxpayers, which would make enforcement quite costly and diffi-
cult. And yet, it is quite difficult to enforce many aspects of the tax
law, including, to take just one of many examples, inclusion of the
cash wages received by a nanny.217 Pointing solely to enforcement dif-
ficulties alone is not enough to understand why the IRS engaged in
categorical nonenforcement with respect to frequent flier miles, but
under-enforcement of the Voting Rights Act). However, even the conclusion in this very
specific instance is not indisputable. Id. at 1219 n.114.
214 See Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (Mar. 11); notes 37-38 and accompa-
nying text.
215 Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (Mar. 11).
216 A number of commentators have suggested using a fixed value per mile to overcome
the valuation difficulties. See, e.g., Dominic L. Daher, The Proposed Federal Taxation of
Frequent Flyer Miles Received from Employers: Good Tax Policy But Bad Politics, 16
Akron Tax J. 1, 18 (2001); Lee S. Garsson, Frequent Flyer Bonus Programs: To Tax or Not
To Tax-Is This the Only Question?, 52 J. Air. L. & Com. 973, 989-92 (1987); Zelenak, Up
in the Air, note 22, at 441. These suggestions would ease administration, but at the cost of
accuracy in individual cases. There is also a question about when the frequent flier miles
would be included. For an example of differing views, compare M. Bernard Aidinoff, Fre-
quent Flyer Bonuses: A Tax Compliance Dilemma, 31 Tax Notes 1345, 1352 (June 29,
1986) (inclusion when miles are used), and Joseph M. Dodge, How To Tax Frequent Flyer
Bonuses, 48 Tax Notes 1301, 1302 (Sept. 3, 1990) (same), with Zelenak, Up in the Air, note
25, at 434-38 (inclusion at time miles are earned).
217 See, e.g., Debra Cohen-Whelan, Protecting the Hand that Rocks the Cradle: Ensur-
ing the Delivery of Work Related Benefits to Child Care Workers, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 1187,
1193-200 (1999); Catherine B. Haskins, Household Employer Payroll Tax Evasion: An
Exploration Based on IRS Data and on Interviews with Employers and Domestic Workers
(Feb. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst) (manu-
script at 124), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171 &con-
text=open-access dissertations ("[N]o fewer than three-quarters of all household
employers are currently failing to pay their nanny taxes."). Indeed, as pointed out in these
and other sources, the lack of compliance in this instance has more profound, negative
consequences than mere reduction in revenue, because of the implications for worker ben-
efit entitlement. See, e.g., id. at 5; Cohen-Wheelan, supra, at 1203.
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not with respect to cash wages paid to nannies. In addition to enforce-
ment difficulties, there must be some other reason why the IRS chose
categorical nonenforcement with respect to frequent flier miles. The
additional reason is likely that there is an underlying sense that the
frequent flier miles just do not feel like income in the same way as the
cash wages, making it less palatable to tax them. 218 Or, perhaps more
cynically (or just realistically, depending on one's perspective), the
IRS may simply be wary of incurring political backlash from taxing
popular fringe benefits, even though the tax law requires taxing them.
While the Code does not provide explicit room for the IRS to make
enforcement decisions based on underlying senses or motivations such
as these, these senses and motivations, which are really policy deci-
sions about the law, inevitably motivate an agency's resource alloca-
tion decisions.
The cases that constitutional law scholars have been sparring over
outside the tax context also underscore the difficulty of determining
when nonenforcement can be explained by limitations on enforce-
ment resources and when it can be explained by policy. Focusing ex-
plicitly on the question of whether DACA saves enforcement
resources, Justice Scalia (among many others) has claimed that "[t]he
husbanding of scarce enforcement resources can hardly be the justifi-
cation for this .... ",219 Others have countered the opposite. 220 Cer-
tainly, with enough effort a cost benefit analysis could be performed,
indicating how much money is or is not saved by the DACA program.
To the extent that such an analysis reveals that DACA actually costs,
rather than saves, money, the enforcement resource limitations expla-
nation might be invalid. But what about in presumably the majority
of cases that agencies face (and maybe even in the case of DACA), in
which cutting enforcement in a particular area does save scarce re-
sources? Would the enforcement resources limitation necessarily ex-
cuse the nonenforcement decision? Like with the categorical
nonenforcement of frequent flier miles, even such an analysis would
not necessarily explain why the particular nonenforcement was chosen
to save resources.2
21
218 Cf. Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 841 ("Taxation of many in-kind benefits may be
nonintuitive and objectionable in the minds of the general public."). Somewhat similarly,
the IRS's decision in Revenue Procedure 93-27 addressing taxation of partnership profits
interest received in exchange for services provided to the partnership may be explained by
the underlying sense that, even if the receipt of a profits interests has some value, it just
does not feel like income when the profits interest has not yet produced any profits. Rev.
Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
219 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 See, e.g., Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 396 n.289.
221 Indeed, in opining regarding DACA, the Office of Legal Counsel does not rely solely
on a distinction between nonenforcement motivated by enforcement resource limitations
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At bottom, in deciding between different means of saving enforce-
ment resources, value judgments not motivated solely by saving en-
forcement resources are inevitably going to come into play. For
instance, an agency might very reasonably decide it should save re-
sources by cutting enforcement against offenders that pose a low
threat to the public. But once anything other than saving enforcement
resources becomes a factor, the decision becomes motivated by a mix
between policy and a desire to save enforcement resources. As a re-
sult, like the distinction between categorical nonenforcement and set-
ting priorities, this distinction between nonenforcement motivated by
policy and nonenforcement motivated by enforcement resource limi-
tations often is not going to map onto reality in a satisfying way.
Finally, I also do not rely on the distinction between time-limited
nonenforcement policies and nonenforcement policies that are not so
limited, even though some constitutional scholars have suggested that
this formal distinction might be important.222 Scholars who have pro-
vided some support for the distinction have not provided much expla-
nation as to why such time limitations may remedy potential
constitutional violations, nor does this Article put forth a vigorous
counterargument.223 It is enough for now to say that if a nonenforce-
ment policy did somehow breach the limits on executive power and
therefore pose constitutional problems, it is hard to see why limiting
such breach to a specified period of time would remedy, rather than
limit, the constitutional breach.224
Moving to the other, prominent existing lens for examining categor-
ical nonenforcement, Laurence Zelenak has suggested in the tax con-
text that categorical nonenforcement may upset the rule of law.2 25
This claim in some ways is difficult to evaluate because it is notori-
ously unclear what, exactly, the rule of law means.226 Notwithstanding
and nonenforcement motivated by policy, instead shifting to an analysis of whether the
policy-based reasons are consistent with congressional intent. See OLC Opinion, note 21,
at 26. While an examination of congressional intent is outside the scope of this Article, it is
enough for now to say that arguments regarding congressional intent are going to be malle-
able and highly contested, especially when examining nonenforcement that explicitly fails
to fulfill the actual law enacted.
222 E.g., Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 358.
223 For one explanation, see id., at 403 (explaining that time limitations "would lend
legitimacy to the President's actions by showing that the Executive is not permanently
rewriting the law").
224 See Love & Garg, note 15, at 1239; Price, note 2, at 706.
225 See text accompanying note 25.
226 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 781
(1989) (presenting the rule of law as a "deeply contested" ideology lacking any widely
accepted formulation). Indeed, in some accounts, rule exploitation (or violation) itself
threatens the rule of law by increasing public awareness of those instances where the rules
diverge from "widely held views of substantive justice." Edward A. Morse, Reflections on
the Rule of Law and "Clear Reflection of Income": What Constrains Discretion?, 8 Cor-
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this ambiguity, however, rule of law accounts tend to emphasize con-
sistency and notice of how the government intends to use its pow-
ers.227 The strongest rule of law argument against categorical
nonenforcement would begin by asserting that Congress' law is su-
preme 228 and therefore the relevant body of law for notice and consis-
tency. If Congress' law is the relevant body of law in terms of notice
and consistency, so the argument would go, then applications of the
law, including categorical nonenforcement, that do not comport with
Congress' law violate the rule of law. Relatedly, some might argue
that separating lawmaking from law execution is an important consti-
tutional value that is essential to promote the rule of law because
lawmakers, foreclosed from the natural temptation to make bad law
and then exempt themselves from it on an ad hoc basis, will instead be
forced to create general rules that will apply to all.229 Since, as some
argue, categorical nonenforcement changes the effective scope of the
law and thereby may look a lot like lawmaking, 230 having an executive
agency, like the IRS, engaging in such practice may blur the lines be-
tween lawmaking and execution and thereby undermine the rule of
law the Constitution arguably meant to protect. This line of argu-
ment, of course, relies on the malleable terminology of rule of law to
find another way of worrying about the potential problems with an
agency overriding Congress.
Prior to accepting and addressing this argument, it is worth pushing
back and suggesting that the concept of rule of law may not be the
best lens for worrying about an agency's ability to override Congress.
Rule of law accounts may as reasonably (or even more reasonably)
look to the agencies themselves to evaluate how administration of the
law comports with the rule of law. When the law on the ground inevi-
tably will differ systematically from the law on the books, the agency
making clear rules about how the law will actually apply can at least
nell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 445, 461-62 (1999). To the extent that categorical nonenforcement
raises overall compliance, it might be possible to argue that categorical nonenforcement
actually enhanced the rule of law. See Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 Fla.
Tax Rev. 325, 344-46 (2014) (examining how announcing concentrated enforcement, with
implicit indication of reduced enforcement in some areas, may increase overall compliance
in certain circumstances).
227 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 209-10 (rev. ed., 1969); Morse, note 226,
at 453.
228 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
229 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 646 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitu-
tionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 434 (1987); Paul R. Verkuil,
Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 301, 317-18 (1989). This has roots in the ideas of Locke, Montesquiecu, and Black-
stone, among others. Manning, supra, at 646.
230 See, e.g., Price, note 2, at 705.
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theoretically best promote the asserted, important constitutional val-
ues of notice of general rules and their consistent application.231 For
example, to the extent that the IRS has informally decided on nonen-
forcement with respect to partnership profits interests, making a cate-
gorical statement of nonenforcement may provide the notice and
guarantee the consistency that are arguably among the hallmarks of
the rule of law. As to the concern that blurring lawmaking and execu-
tion can lead to bad law and the exemption of lawmakers from it,
categorical nonenforcement simply seems unlikely to lead to this out-
come. Rather than making law that will apply to others, categorical
nonenforcement is an express commitment to general
nonenforcement.
Accepting for the sake of argument, however, that the rule of law
concern appropriately seeks to protect Congress' law, the most press-
ing objection to categorical nonenforcement would be as follows. Im-
agine that Congress disagrees with an IRS announcement that it is
engaging in categorical nonenforcement of the income tax as to large
partnerships. By its nature, the fact that the agency is engaging in
categorical nonenforcement means that the law already indicates that
enforcement should be occurring. In response to the offensive cate-
gorical nonenforcement, then, what could Congress do to protect its
prerogative? Could it pass the "we really mean it" law? 232
While this question implicates an expansive inquiry into how and
whether Congress can control agencies, this Article need not delve
deeply into the extensive literature about this inquiry233 in order to
posit that Congress has tools at its disposal to respond to categorical
nonenforcement it dislikes. As an initial matter, in at least some in-
stances Congress will be able to respond to disapproved-of categorical
nonenforcement decisions by using various levers at its disposal, such
as oversight hearings, appropriations control, informal influence, and
even the threat of legislation reigning in the agency.234 In one case
study in the tax context, a congressional mandate to crack down on
231 Cf. Davis, note 55, at 94 ("A common kind of confused thinking is to prefer the
secret ad hoc policies to the open uniform policies on the ground that the enacted law
should be respected!").
232 1 thank Michael Froomkin for posing this colorful inquiry.
233 See, e.g., sources cited in note 73.
234 Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L.
Rev. 727, 727 (2009) ("Congress engages in an extensive and ever-increasing level of over-
sight of the activities of the executive branch."); Kagan, note 66, at 2258 ("The legislative
sanctions backing up the system include new legislation, budget cuts, and embarrassing
oversight hearings."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law 133 (2d ed. 2012) ("Con-
gress has more power over agencies than any other institution."); Mark Seidenfeld, The
Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 Duke L.J. 1059,
1076 (2001) (describing threat of legislation).
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earned income tax credit (EITC) noncompliance and Congress' ap-
propriation of funds to carry out this task caused the IRS to subject
the EITC to particularly high rates of enforcement, despite concerns
about the low revenue dollars per audit at stake in EITC audits and
the hardship such audits impose on the working poor.2 35 Indeed, the
IRS's willingness to dutifully crack down on the EITC as a result of
Congress' intervention, even in the face of such concerns, serves as a
good example of Congress' ability to direct enforcement when it
wants to and bear political responsibility for doing so. 236 There are
other examples of Congress responding to enforcement it did not like
in the tax area and beyond. For instance, as Zelenak points out, be-
ginning in the late 1970's, Congress prevented the IRS from carrying
out its threat of asserting inclusion of a variety of fringe benefits in
income by imposing a moratorium and then enacting legislation nar-
rowing the scope of the law and the resulting enforcement. 237 More
recently, Congress has cut the IRS's budget, seemingly in at least par-
tial response to disagreement with certain IRS enforcement practices
and the threat of the IRS enforcing tax provisions that some
lawmakers view as regulatory overreach, such as various aspects of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 238 Of course, these last
two examples illustrate the threat of enforcement, rather than nonen-
forcement, activating Congress. Perhaps more relevantly with respect
to nonenforcement, Congress' response to President Nixon's im-
poundment of funds is an additional, useful example of congressional
response to executive inaction.239
If Congress does not respond to categorical nonenforcement, that
failure may itself be valuable. As discussed previously, a particularly
troubling aspect of the extensive administrative state is that it offers
Congress the opportunity to pass public-regarding law that it ensures
235 See, e.g., Leslie Book, The IRS's EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in
the Net, 81 Or. L. Rev. 351, 373-74, 373 n.71 (2002) (detailing the higher audit rates for
low-income taxpayers in light of increased EITC enforcement); Taxing the Poor (PBS
NewsHour television broadcast Apr. 15, 2004), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/business-jan-june04-taxes 04-15/; Liz Pulliam Weston, Low Incomes More
Prone to Audits by IRS, L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, at Al. The EITC audit literature is
extensive. See, e.g., Book, supra.
236 See also Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement as Substance in Tax
Compliance, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1679,1739 (2013) (explaining, in context of proposed
measured enforcement regime in which the IRS would have substantial discretion to set
the tax rates, that Congress could "respond to those rates with statutory changes if it found
them warranted").
237 Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 843-44.
238 See, e.g., Rachael Bade, Republicans Seek to Cripple IRS, Politico (Dec. 11, 2014,
5:33 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/republicans-irs-regulations-l13484.html.
239 See Transcript of President's News Conference, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1973, at 20, § 13
(demanding explanation from President Nixon in response to criticism that impoundment
of funds is an overreach of the executive power).
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never comes to pass, for example by providing insufficient enforce-
ment funding. 240 Congress' failure to respond to an enforcement diffi-
culty that was great enough to merit an agency's categorical
nonenforcement may play the valuable role of forcing Congress to
take public responsibility for failed implementation of the law.
On the other hand, some might object that forcing Congress to re-
spond to categorical nonenforcement or take public responsibility for
failure to respond is inherently inappropriate. While Congress may
theoretically respond to categorical nonenforcement in a number of
ways, it may be quite difficult for Congress to mobilize to do So. 2 4 1
Some might argue that, even if Congress could mobilize to respond, it
should not have to. The law says what it says and Congress should not
have to say it twice. Perhaps most problematically, some might worry
that even if Congress does mobilize to declare its disapproval, there is
nothing to stop the agency from nonetheless again failing to enforce,
motivated by the same beliefs about the reasons for nonenforcement.
At its worst, then, categorical nonenforcement may serve as a limitless
tool for runaway, unelected administrative agencies to violate Con-
gress' lawmaking supremacy.
The difficulty with this concern, however, is that setting low priori-
ties also can violate Congress' law when setting priorities has essen-
tially the same impact as categorical nonenforcement. In this regard,
the rule of law objection to categorical nonenforcement also relies on
the formal distinction between categorical nonenforcement and set-
ting priorities that in many circumstances may be more illusory than
real. In such circumstances, categorical nonenforcement's virtue of
being transparent may very well outweigh any formal, greater in-
fringement on Congress' law. Indeed, by making nonenforcement
more salient and specific, categorical nonenforcement may actually in-
crease the ability of Congress to respond.242
240 See text accompanying note 110.
241 Cf. Andrias, note 104, at 1084-85 (exploring reasons why, "while Congress could the-
oretically address coordination and prioritization issues, it is unlikely to do so in any effec-
tive or sustained way"); Seidenfeld, note 234, at 1075-76 (cataloguing reasons why it is
difficult for Congress to override an agency rule).
242 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doc-
trine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1423-24 (2000) (exploring, in the
regulatory context, how an administrative-standards requirement for agency exercises of
delegated power "may enhance congressional oversight by providing an additional piece of
information for Congress to consider in evaluating a controversial agency proposal"); Love
& Garg, note 15, at 1236-37 ("Congress has only stepped in where the president's decision
not to act was particularly public and thus where it was relatively easy for Congress to
identify the issue and generate support for a legislative response.").
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Relatedly, it is important to realize that neither of the alternative
lenses, at least at present,243 offers a judicially enforceable means of
policing nonenforcement to ensure that it stays within perceived, ac-
ceptable boundaries (and, for the reasons suggested previously, it is
not even necessarily clear whether policing the boundaries along the
lines set forth by the existing lenses would necessarily be desirable).
Rule of law is an aspirational concept not subject to legal doctrines or
judicial enforcement. While constitutional law is very much the busi-
ness of courts, as discussed above, the difficulty of courts policing non-
enforcement has caused the Supreme Court to declare a general
presumption against review of agency nonenforcement under adminis-
trative law.2 44 Even constitutional scholars concerned about categori-
cal nonenforcement have suggested, for similar reasons, that executive
branch officials may have to police themselves to ensure that nonen-
forcement comports with proper conceptions of executive power.245
Even if courts could police the lines of acceptable nonenforcement
(and decided to do so), restrictive standing doctrine would make it
difficult to find parties who could challenge the nonenforcement,
making the likelihood of judicial review remote.2 46 To make this point
most sharply, imagining that the alternative lenses offer a judicially
enforceable means of delineating acceptable nonenforcement requires
imagining a different judicial review regime than the one that exists at
present. If one is imagining such a regime, one should just as well
imagine a regime in which categorical nonenforcement could be eval-
uated to ensure it promotes agency legitimacy.
All of this is to say that the alternative lenses offered by scholars are
best understood as abstract contemplations of when and how nonen-
forcement is acceptable. 247 The lens of agency legitimacy offered in
this Article is no different in this regard. I have argued that, under
243 Of course, it is possible that judicial review of nonenforcement may evolve in the
future. Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, note 198, at 95 (describing landmark administrative law
case finding that EPA had failed to adequately justify denying a rulemaking petition as
"one in a series of rebukes to the Bush administration's generous vision of executive
power"). Even if courts revisit judicial review of presidentially directed nonenforcement,
for reasons expressed in Heckler v. Chaney, it is unlikely judicial review will apply rou-
tinely to agency nonenforcement decisions. 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985). In any event, to
the extent any evolution in judicial review occurs, hopefully the interaction between non-
enforcement and agency legitimacy examined in this Article is considered.
244 See text accompanying notes 177-79.
245 See, e.g., Price, note 2, at 747-48.
246 See text accompanying notes 181-83.
247 The argument for administrative agencies to police themselves when judicial enforce-
ment is too difficult has been made in other contexts. See, e.g., Anthony, note 144, at 1372
("To induce agency observance of proper rulemaking procedures, it is not efficient to rely
upon judicial review, which is uncertain and spasmodic and at best a belated curative. It
would seem much more productive to set forth for the agencies a clear and comprehensive
statement of the precepts they should obey.").
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certain circumstances, agencies like the IRS may use categorical non-
enforcement in order to increase accountability for, deliberation re-
garding, and nonarbitrariness of inevitable agency nonenforcement of
the law. Moreover, if agencies do so only as a particularly salient
means of communicating difficult enforcement decisions (accompa-
nied by a willingness to respond to cues to change such decisions), or
as a means of regularizing their enforcement decisions, the agencies'
uses of categorical nonenforcement may not threaten Congress' law-
making supremacy. While this Article cannot ensure that nonenforce-
ment will stay within these bounds, it nonetheless posits that scholars
and administrative officials may benefit from integrating agency legiti-
macy into the analysis of executive nonenforcement of the law. Doing
so may help prompt a deeper consideration of how important values
of democratic governance apply to the realities of agencies' systematic
nonenforcement of the law.
VI. PorENTIAL. OI.IECTIONS
In addition to the possible arguments that an alternative lens might
be a better mode of analysis for categorical nonenforcement, a num-
ber of other potential objections to my argument can be made.
Before addressing some of the more pressing objections, it is worth-
while to emphasize the scope of the argument being made. I certainly
am not making an affirmative, normative case that categorical nonen-
forcement is appropriate in all instances of nonenforcement. Rather,
I seek to sketch with clarity how an examination of categorical nonen-
forcement through the lens of agency legitimacy can offer a more
nuanced view than what has been suggested recently by commentators
and scholars. The key point to recognize is that this Article argues
how agencies, under certain circumstances, can use categorical nonen-
forcement in a manner that will increase accountability, deliberation,
and/or nonarbitrariness regarding inevitable nonenforcement, not that
they always will use categorical nonenforcement to meet these
objectives.
Perhaps most pressingly, a powerful objection to categorical nonen-
forcement might be that, even to the extent that it promotes certain
values, it can pose a significant threat to compliance. The argument
might go as follows. Categorical nonenforcement might increase the
legitimacy of an agency's nonenforcement decision. However, cate-
gorical nonenforcement also all but ensures that regulated parties will
ignore the law, and the erosion of deterrence may be a significant
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agency failing.248 To use the large partnership example again, to the
extent that a low rate of audit (as compared to no audit) yields some
tax compliance, perhaps any benefits of formal, categorical nonen-
forcement would not be worth the cost. Instead of categorically not
enforcing, therefore, perhaps the IRS should simply maintain a low
enforcement priority and make a lot of noise about the constraints
preventing it from doing more.
There are a number of responses to this set of concerns. One is that
there are counterbalancing factors at work. Compliance with the law
(which, in the tax context, results in tax revenue) has some value, but
so does the legitimacy of an agency's nonenforcement decisions.
Hopefully focusing on the latter opens the door to a consideration of
how to balance values, even if it does not complete the task.
A more pointed, and necessarily preliminary, response is that these
values may not necessarily always be in clear tension. For instance, as
suggested previously, insiders were purportedly aware of the enforce-
ment difficulties with auditing large partnerships prior to the issue be-
coming a subject of public awareness and debate. 249 This example
underscores a more general point, which is that sophisticated, regu-
lated parties are often more aware of informal policies of nonenforce-
ment than the general public. 250 As a result, in many circumstances,
increasing agency legitimacy or promoting other values through cate-
gorical nonenforcement may not come at much of a price at all in
terms of reduced compliance of the parties subject to the law at issue.
In such cases, categorical nonenforcement may score legitimacy gains
without raising significant, counterbalancing concerns regarding
compliance.
Finally, in regard to the argument that perhaps what the IRS should
do is make noise about its enforcement difficulties without actually
making nonenforcement categorical, I do not reject making noise as a
potentially productive means of responding to a significant enforce-
ment difficulty. Making noise may increase accountability and delib-
248 Elliott, note 120, at 5 (2014) ("Telling taxpayers that the IRS can't audit them won't
encourage compliance."). Indeed, even if the compliance of the taxpayers at issue does not
fall, voluntary compliance of other taxpayers may fall if the announcement of nonenforce-
ment reduces norms of compliance. On the other hand, an announcement of nonenforce-
ment as to certain taxpayers or tax issues may cause taxpayers to believe that the
probability of enforcement has increased elsewhere, thereby raising compliance. See Price,
note 3, at 738 (providing examples throughout U.S. history where presidential administra-
tions have utilized nonenforcement power as "part of a broader effort to achieve full com-
pliance with congressional statutes"). In any event, a close examination of the impact of
categorical nonenforcement on compliance is outside the scope of this Article.
249 See Brock, note 36, at 42 (reporting based on interviews that "practitioners generally
know that the Service does not want to conduct TEFRA partnership audits"); text accom-
panying note 201.
250 Andrias, note 104, at 1098.
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eration, even if it does less to ensure nonarbitrariness. To the extent
that making noise creates a real possibility of an accountable and/or
deliberative response, and to the extent that arbitrary enforcement is
not a particular concern in a given situation, making noise while main-
taining a low enforcement priority can serve as a legitimate means of
nonenforcement. To the extent that such noise does not engender an
accountable and/or deliberative response, or to the extent there is a
particular concern about arbitrary exercises of limited enforcement in
a given situation, categorical nonenforcement is the better solution.
In other words, I do not suggest that categorical nonenforcement is
the optimal solution, but rather argue that it is a tool that agencies
may employ to increase the legitimacy of essential nonenforcement
when simply making noise about the essential nonenforcement is un-
likely to yield accountability and/or deliberation regarding a signifi-
cant enforcement failing, or when arbitrary enforcement is a
particular concern.
Additionally, some might object that categorical nonenforcement
poses a threat to the ability of the President and/or Congress to set
their own agendas. Both politically accountable branches face signifi-
cant limits on their time and political capital, 51 and being forced to
address an instance of categorical nonenforcement may distract them
from other concerns they view as more pressing.252 Categorical non-
enforcement certainly may distract the President and/or Congress
from other, preferred issues. However, it need not do so. As scholars
have fleshed out, one major way that Congress can monitor agencies
is by so-called "fire alarm" oversight, whereby individuals and interest
groups sound a metaphorical fire alarm when the agency is engaging
in problematic behavior.2 53 Categorical nonenforcement is a fire
alarm of sorts, but it is rung by the agency itself, rather than other
constituents. As with the fire alarms that other constituents ring, Con-
gress and/or the President can respond to the fire alarm, but need not
251 See, e.g., Love & Garg, note 15, at 1235 ("Congress could not possibly choose to
exercise its oversight powers to revisit every instance of executive inaction.");
Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 361, 391 (explaining that "presidents have a finite amount of
time to devote to a seemingly infinite number of matters under their supervision and must
focus their attention on their most important priorities" and exploring how responding to
extra-legislative vetoes consumes congressional time that could be spent elsewhere); Peter
L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 242, 255 (1998) (citing the "limited resources of time and effort Congress
has available to it for its legislative agenda").
252 See Bressman, note 62, at 511-12 (describing problem with proposals that envision
heavy involvement of the President or Congress in details of regulatory policy).
253 McCubbins & Schwartz, note 73, at 166.
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do so.254 To the extent that the categorical nonenforcement fire alarm
is meant to alert Congress, the President, and the public of important
enforcement decisions or severe enforcement difficulties, failure to re-
spond at least forces a politically accountable acknowledgement of the
unwillingness to respond, even if it is justified by the need to focus on
other concerns. Additionally, agencies ringing a fire alarm in situa-
tions that merit attention may lower the costs that the President and!
or Congress might otherwise expend monitoring enforcement. 255
Finally, some might ask whether there might be better ways to go
about getting some of the benefits of categorical nonenforcement
fleshed out in this Article. For instance, Kate Andrias has set forth an
extensive proposal to institutionalize presidential involvement in en-
forcement, including by having the President's central apparatus in-
volved to a greater extent in shaping, coordinating, and publicizing
enforcement policy.256 Accordingly, some might argue that institu-
tionalizing presidential involvement in enforcement might produce ac-
countability benefits without the same costs in terms of potential
infringement on Congress' legislative prerogative. While institutional-
izing presidential control over enforcement may have a number of vir-
tues, it has not happened yet, and there are certainly a variety of
barriers to such a system being put in place.257 Even to the extent that
it is put in place, presidential administrations will never have enough
time and resources to exert control over all of every agency's enforce-
ment agenda, nor does Andrias suggest that presidential administra-
tions should exert such plenary control.258 As a result, Andrias'
proposal, if put in place, may help yield greater accountability for
some nonenforcement, but does not preclude questions regarding the
254 Cf. Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 387 (explaining how Congress "is not obligated to
reconsider a vetoed bill and frequently does not" and how Congress may respond similarly
to other instances of executive override of Congress' laws).
255 See id. at 391 ("The extra-legislative veto obviates the need for Congress to antici-
pate every circumstance in which the law might be applied poorly .... "). Indeed, the
potential time and cost savings contributed by fire alarm oversight was central to its origi-
nal conception. See McCubbins & Schwartz, note 73, at 168.
256 Andrias, note 104, at 1077-103. Similarly, Sant'Ambrogio has suggested that "an ex-
ecutive order might require agencies to submit proposed enforcement policies, like pro-
posed rulemakings, to the White House and Congress in advance of their implementation."
Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 403.
257 See text accompanying note 110; see also Andrias, note 104, at 1107 (acknowledging
the executive branch's resistance to politically disadvantageous disclosure); Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev.
599, 646 (2010) ("No President has used directives on any more than a selective basis as to
executive-branch agencies. The White House has picked its battles, acting only when an
issue is particularly salient.").
258 Andrias, note 104, at 1038.
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legitimacy of the nonenforcement that would remain outside of insti-
tutionalized presidential control. 259
Alternatively, some might argue that, rather than making mere
statements of categorical nonenforcement, agencies should use the
APA's notice and comment procedures2 60 to the extent possible to is-
sue their nonenforcement policies. This idea is rooted in deep-seated
beliefs that the APA's notice and comment procedures for rulemaking
serve important purposes in a "fair and effective" system of limited
government, such as providing notice to affected parties of the rules
being considered, increasing the quality of the rules by requiring the
agency to gather and take into account comments from the public,
increasing public acceptance as a result of the openness of the process,
and providing a record that can facilitate judicial review. 261 Mere
statements of categorical nonenforcement that are not promulgated
subject to APA notice and comment may lose these valuable benefits.
Indeed, proponents of nonarbitrariness theories of agency legitimacy
have tended to support the use of notice and comment to the extent
possible. Davis argued that enforcement policy should be made
through notice and comment "to give systematic and clear answers to
all the major questions, thus reducing the power of selective enforce-
ment in individual cases, and thereby reducing the injustice that re-
sults from uneven enforcement. '262 Bressman has similarly argued
that "agencies must choose notice-and-comment procedures, to the
extent possible, for issuing standards in advance of applying them to
particular facts" because "[o]ther procedures ... do not best promote
the values of fairness, predictability, and participation important to a
genuinely nonarbitrary administrative state. '263
There are several responses to this proposed alternative. While I
certainly do not mean to suggest that a mere statement of categorical
nonenforcement is superior to rules issued through notice and com-
ment, I also argue that for a number of reasons categorical nonen-
forcement nonetheless may play a salutary role. First, notice and
comment rulemaking may not be an available vehicle for many non-
enforcement policies. When the nonenforcement is a policy statement
that the agency will not be enforcing clear law on the books, as a legal
259 See Price, note 2, at 755 n.360 (noting that Andrias' proposal "largely sidesteps the
question of whether categorical nonenforcement policies should be permissible in the first
place").
260 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
261 Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-ossification: A Harder Look at
Agency Policy Statements, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 667, 677 (1996); Anthony, note 144, at
1314, 1373-74; Mendelson, note 144, at 409.
262 Davis, note 55, at 92-93.
263 Bressman, note 62, at 533-34.
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matter it is unlikely that a court would uphold such a policy if the
agency attempted to issue it through notice and comment. 264 And yet,
despite the likely unavailability of notice and comment, for the rea-
sons fleshed out previously, a well-reasoned statement of categorical
nonenforcement issued outside of notice and comment may provide a
number of valuable benefits. While less desirable, even a poorly rea-
soned statement of categorical nonenforcement can have benefits,
such as preventing the arbitrary result of being the only taxpayer ever
enforced against under unadministrable aspects of the tax law.
Zelenak has argued that when enforcement difficulties preclude en-
forcement, Congress should provide agencies the regulatory authority
to alter the law so as to accommodate the enforcement difficulties,
thereby allowing agencies to act through the transparent mechanism
of notice and comment rulemaking.265 This proposal faces difficulties.
In many cases, Congress simply will not accept this suggestion, per-
haps because Congress does not know of the enforcement conun-
drums or because Congress simply does not get around to providing
the authorization. The lack of authorization does not necessarily indi-
cate a desire for full enforcement, but rather leaves the agency at
square one in terms of what to do when enforcement decisions have to
be made. Additionally, the seemingly unlimited delegation may cre-
ate a nondelegation problem, even under the extremely limited appli-
cation of such doctrine, 66 although standing considerations may
prevent such a challenge.
Indeed, and perhaps more controversially, even in situations in
which notice and comment procedures may be a viable means of issu-
ing the nonenforcement policy, making mere statements of categorical
nonenforcement may still have some benefits. To provide some con-
text, an agency may be able to use notice and comment procedures to
issue a nonenforcement policy if either (1) the nonenforcement policy
is an interpretation of the statute, or (2) the nonenforcement policy
actually binds the public (for instance by setting enforcement or non-
enforcement standards, which then serve conclusively as the basis for
enforcement action). 267 The former may, but is not required to, be
264 Such a statement may run afoul of Chevron's step one, in which "the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Contra Davis,
note 55, at 93 (explaining that, surprisingly, the police can "formally through rules provide
that church bingo games and social poker games are not a crime" when "a statute flatly
provides that gambling is a crime."). Davis reaches this conclusion based on its desirabil-
ity, not an analysis of legality.
265 Zelenak, Custom, note 22, at 852.
266 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001).
267 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
that FDA "action levels" for contaminants, which indicated levels of contamination below
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issued through notice and comment, 268 and the latter must be issued
through such procedures. 269
Notwithstanding the availability (or even the requirement) of notice
and comment in such cases, an agency may not actually use notice and
comment. A perennial objection to notice and comment procedures is
that they are quite costly for agencies and a requirement that agencies
use them may have the unintended consequence of causing agencies
to engage in less transparent policymaking to avoid the costs of the
procedures (and/or less policymaking altogether). 270 While this objec-
tion can be countered with the argument that the benefits of notice
and comment procedures may outweigh the costs and that agencies
may abide by notice and comment if they have no alternative means
of issuing the guidance,27' the objection nonetheless has particular
power in the nonenforcement context.272 Whereas agencies will often
bear the costs of notice and comment in order to get regulated parties
to abide by standards of behavior that the agency is charged with ob-
taining and in order to get courts to defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion of what standards of behavior bind the regulated parties,273
nonenforcement is a standard of behavior that the agency would vol-
untarily impose on itself. Agencies may not have as strong of an in-
centive to ensure that they abide by their nonenforcement, and
therefore may not be as willing to bear the costs of notice and com-
ment in such circumstances.
Indeed, at least one interesting case study illustrates the dangers of
forcing an agency to abide by notice and comment rulemaking with
respect to an enforcement policy or a nonenforcement standard. In a
protracted litigation in the 1980's, plaintiffs argued that the FDA's es-
tablishment of "action levels" for aflatoxin levels in feed corn violated
which enforcement proceedings ordinarily would not occur, were subject to notice and
comment procedures).
268 Anthony, note 144, at 1376-77 (explaining that, although not required to do so, agen-
cies may use notice and comment to issue interpretive rules, and discussing benefits of
doing so).
269 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
270 For seminal treatments of this widespread "ossification" thesis, see, e.g., Thomas 0.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L.
Rev. 59 (1995). For a recent challenge to this widespread and deeply influential thesis, see
Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical
Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1414 (2012).
271 David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 Yale L.J. 276, 303-05 (2010); Mendelson, note 144, at 403.
272 Cf. Sant'Ambrogio, note 14, at 403-04 ("Requiring rulemaking to set enforcement
policies might discourage agencies from adapting their enforcement policies to a changing
environment or encourage them to conceal such adjustments.").
273 Yackee & Yackee, note 270, at 1474-75.
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a number of requirements. 274 The action levels indicated levels of
contamination below which enforcement proceedings ordinarily
would not occur.275 After the case went up to the Supreme Court and
back down the D.C. Circuit, the D.C. Circuit ultimately held that the
action levels were invalid because they should have been issued via
notice and comment procedures. 276 Instead of then complying with
the procedures, the FDA simply announced that its action levels
would not be binding, thereby denying regulated parties and the pub-
lic reliable information regarding the FDA's nonenforcement pol-
icy.277 As lamented by one commentator regarding the case, "[t]o the
extent that the agency's own statement of prosecutorial policy is in
some sense 'binding' on the agency, then the policy only serves the
function of regularizing agency behavior and reducing case-specific ar-
bitrariness all the more" and if an agency abandons statements of such
policies as a result of notice and comment procedures being imposed,
the agency also gives up "the assurances of predictability, fairness,
openness, and agency personnel management that self-binding regula-
tion may have provided. ' 278 The case serves as a cautionary tale of
how forcing nonenforcement policy to abide by notice and comment
procedures may simply drive the procedures deeper underground,
away from public view. The bottom line is that, although statements
of categorical nonenforcement might not always serve as a procedur-
ally ideal means of an agency limiting its discretion, it may play an
essential role in situations in which agencies cannot use notice and
comment procedures, and it may even have benefits in situations in
which agencies could use notice and comment procedures but will not
do so in practice. In sum, despite potential objections, categorical
nonenforcement has a role to play in legitimating agencies' inevitable,
systematic nonenforcement of the law.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has taken a close look at categorical nonenforcement of
the tax law through the lens of agency legitimacy. It has shown that in
some circumstances agencies can use categorical nonenforcement in a
manner that increases accountability, deliberation, and nonarbitrari-
ness of agency nonenforcement, thereby increasing the legitimacy of
274 Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 476 U.S. 974
(1986), on remand, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
275 Cmty. Nutrition. Inst., 476 U.S. at 977.
276 Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d at 948-49.
277 Action Levels for Added Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food, 53 Fed. Reg.
5043 (Food and Drug Admin. Feb. 19, 1988).
278 Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v.
Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 131, 152-53 (1992).
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the nonenforcement. In some ways this claim is quite controversial
and faces significant pressure on a number of fronts. On the one
hand, to the extent that the nonenforcement is clearly in conflict with
Congress' law, categorical nonenforcement may run afoul of Con-
gress' lawmaking supremacy. On the other hand, to the extent the
nonenforcement may be an interpretation of or consistent with the
law, a mere statement of categorical nonenforcement may undercut
the important values of notice and comment rulemaking. Focusing on
the difficult nonenforcement decisions that agencies must make on a
daily basis nonetheless reveals that in some circumstances mere state-
ments of categorical nonenforcement may be the most realistic means
of communicating important nonenforcement decisions to politically
accountable officials and/or the public, or to regularize nonenforce-
ment decisions within the agency. Moreover, these nonenforcement
decisions do not necessarily represent the final say regarding the law,
but rather may be a step toward a more accountable, deliberative,
nonarbitrary set of rules. While in an ideal world agencies may not
face hard choices about when not to enforce the law, in reality they
do, and, in light of such realities, categorical nonenforcement may
help increase the legitimacy of at least some of those choices.
This Article certainly does not examine every facet of nonenforce-
ment. Notably, it does not directly examine whether the values of ac-
countability, deliberation, and/or nonarbitrariness can save
presidentially directed categorical nonenforcement, although these
values may very well be important in evaluating such nonenforce-
ment. For instance, one could View presidentially directed categorical
nonenforcement as increasing the visibility of what would otherwise
be an agency nonenforcement decision, meaning that agency legiti-
macy would remain central to the analysis. To take a prominent ex-
ample, to the extent that the capital gains or estate tax
(hypothetically) is already being impotently enforced at the hands of
the IRS, presidential direction of categorical nonenforcement may
provide valuable accountability and public deliberation, as well as
possibly increase nonarbitrariness by committing IRS agents not to
enforce in a uniform fashion. Alternatively, if the President is di-
recting categorical nonenforcement in a manner that does not map
onto the agency's own choices, the analysis may be somewhat differ-
ent. Depending on one's perspective (and the nature of the decision,
along with the relevant theory of agency legitimacy), such direction
may raise concerns about the President overriding considered agency
judgment.279 However, in such a case, presidentially directed categor-
279 For discussions of concerns about presidential direction of agency decisions (prima-
rily in the rulemaking context), see, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, note 199, at 54-64; Thomas
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ical nonenforcement really raises two, separate issues. The first is
whether categorical nonenforcement by the agency is legitimate. The
second is whether it is appropriate for the President to direct the
agency nonenforcement policy. By starting from the premise that cat-
egorical nonenforcement can be evaluated from the perspective of
agency legitimacy, this Article helps clarify the potentially competing
values at stake, and helps clear the way for a conversation focused on
presidential direction.
Moreover, completely aside from how this Article contributes to re-
cent debates about presidentially directed categorical nonenforce-
ment, its framework for examining the legitimacy of agency
nonenforcement is crucial. Even if a President never comes along and
attempts to slash the income tax through nonenforcement, the IRS
will be making decisions every day about how not to enforce the tax
law. Indeed, this Article has hopefully persuaded readers that the
IRS's mission to "enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all,"280
inevitably implies an accompanying responsibility when it refrains
from enforcing the law to do so with the greatest possible integrity
and fairness to all. The latter portion of the mission might not make
for as great of a slogan, but it is nonetheless an inextricable part of
what the IRS and many other agencies do. Examining the IRS's, as
well as other agencies', nonenforcement decisions at least in part
through the lens of agency legitimacy is essential to ensure that when
agencies across government refrain from enforcing the law they do so
in a manner that is consistent with democratic governance for all.
0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L.
Rev. 443, 454-63 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 714-15 (2007). Even proponents of the
political accountability theory may argue that that the President should have supervisory
authority, but should not necessarily direct or override a considered agency decision. For
an argument that presidential influence should be disclosed and, in certain cases, afforded
some respect, see Watts, note 78. For a related argument that agency action potentially
should be treated differently than presidential action, see Strauss, note 90, at 636 ("It is the
potential powerfulness of those heads of government that gives special meaning to the
formalities of the [Constitution]. For the inferior parts of government, subject to law and
the webs of control woven by all three of the named heads, the same risks do not arise;
agency actions are of lesser concern than the President's for just this reason."). But see id.
at 642 (suggesting that the President plays an appropriate role in setting enforcement
priorities).
280 Internal Revenue Serv., The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited Sept. 24,
2014).
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